Building Trust for Better Investments
Author
Andrew Behar - As You Sow
As You Sow
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

Today's hyper-connected and data-driven economy means that investors consider many risk factors when making critical decisions in line with their fiduciary duty. Shareholders rely on the SEC to require that companies release this material information. However, many disclosures, including climate emissions, have historically been inaccurate, unverified, often misleading, and released in a variety of formats, making comparisons impossible.

This chaotic reporting process creates inconsistency, which in turn increases risk for individual investors and those who manage trillions of dollars in retirement funds for hardworking Americans. The new climate disclosure rule assures that these material disclosures are accurate, verified, and in a standardized format. It is the manifestation of the most fundamental mission of the SEC: to establish trust between companies and their beneficial owners, and to protect investors and maintain a fair and orderly market.

As shareholder advocates, we at As You Sow are all too aware of the urgent need for action on climate change. It is a material issue that affects all companies and therefore all investors. It is one that requires bold and decisive action from governments, businesses, and shareholders around the world. That’s why the SEC’s recent proposal is so significant. It marks an important step forward in ensuring that investors have access to the information they need to make informed decisions about the risks and opportunities presented by the transition to a low-carbon economy.

As the extractive economy winds down and a new regenerative economy based on justice and sustainability moves to center stage, this new rule—along with the SEC’s proposed fund-naming rule, Europe’s ESG taxonomy, the International Sustainable Standards Board’s global definitions of materiality, and other critical frameworks—is needed to assure a smooth transition to the new economic paradigm.

Although companies have already begun to address climate risk, progress has been uneven and slow, and disclosures continue to be disparate, non-comparable, and lacking in critical information necessary for investors to make prudent capital-allocation decisions. Similarly, while many companies are taking climate-related action, most are not planning sufficiently for the risks of warming—putting shareholder investments in jeopardy.

One of the most notable aspects of the SEC’s proposed rule is its alignment with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Disclosure. The TCFD is a globally recognized framework providing guidance on how companies should assess and report their climate-related risks and opportunities. It was established in 2015 by the Financial Stability Board, a body that promotes international financial steadiness.

For example, the proposed rule includes a requirement for companies to report on the physical and transition risks they face as a result of climate change. These risks can include the impact of extreme weather events on a company’s operations and the potential for regulatory changes or market shifts to affect demand for products or services. By requiring companies to report on these risks, the SEC is helping investors understand the full range of challenges and opportunities they may encounter as the world moves to a low-carbon future.

The proposed rule includes a number of provisions that will be particularly beneficial to investors. One of the most significant is the requirement for third-party attestation of a company’s greenhouse gas emissions. This will provide a valuable check on the self-reported data that companies currently provide, which have often been found to be incomplete or inconsistent. It will also give investors greater confidence in the accuracy and reliability of climate-related disclosures.

While many aspects of the SEC’s proposed rule are cause for optimism, some areas fall short. One of the most notable omissions is the relatively limited coverage of adaptation and resilience. These are crucial considerations for companies operating in a rapidly changing climate, and investors need to understand how well companies are prepared to cope with the physical and transition risks they face. Firms should also be required to disclose their plans for adapting to and mitigating these risks, as well as the resources they have allocated to these efforts.

We are hopeful that the SEC’s proposed rule on climate disclosure will be adopted. We strongly believe that it will have a positive impact on the quality and consistency of climate-related reporting and help ensure a more fair, orderly, and efficient market. The accuracy and reliability of climate-related and other material disclosures is a critical function of the SEC, and it is essential to building and maintaining trust between investors and the companies they own. The proposed rule will enable investors to make informed decisions based on objective and accurate data—a goal that every investor should support.

Andrew Behar is CEO of As You Sow, a nonprofit practitioner of shareholder advocacy and engagement.

The Missing Half of Disclosures: Adaptation
Author
Ira Feldman - Adaptation Leader
Adaptation Leader
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

My nonprofit organization, Adaptation Leader, has tracked the SEC’s proposed rule on climate-related disclosures with great interest. Admittedly, we were disappointed the agency opted to limit its rule to climate disclosures rather than a broader environmental, social, and governance or sustainability framing. Climate change is an essential consideration within ESG and sustainability reporting, but it does not present the complete picture for disclosure purposes.

Within the narrow climate focus presented in the proposed rule, we believe the SEC has done an excellent job of outlining disclosure requirements for greenhouse gas reduction, or mitigation. Unfortunately, the rule largely ignores the adaptation and resilience side of climate action. This is a critical mistake.

The brief mentions of adaptation and resilience in the proposed rule are superficial and not actionable. While multiple sections explain the rationale for several mitigation-related provisions, like attestation, metrics, scenarios, and others, there is not one analogous section offering rationale or guidance for adaptation. The result is an incomplete, imbalanced scope of material climate considerations that will result in a far less robust disclosure rule than needed. But not all hope is lost; the agency can remedy this.

In comments Adaptation Leader submitted to the SEC, we urged the agency to correct this imbalance and incorporate adaptation considerations. The agency should pay equal attention to mitigation and adaptation.

The SEC’s emphasis on mitigation stems from the agency’s over-reliance on the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures framework, known as the TCFD. The proposed rule is so focused on GHG reduction that it virtually excludes substance on the other half of climate action: adaptation and resilience.

We have no gripe with the TCFD; it is an influential framework that has effectively advanced climate disclosure. The TCFD drafters have readily acknowledged that adaptation was not in their remit. So, while TCFD is an excellent base for GHG-related disclosures, it should not be the sole base for all climate disclosure.

The fact that the adaptation and resilience field is less developed than the mitigation space does not justify the SEC’s inattention to their inclusion in the proposed rule. On the contrary, the agency should lead on this issue. It should strongly acknowledge the importance of adaptation in the climate risk equation and urge greater corporate attention to developing and implementing adaptation strategies.

Recent attention on adaptation and resilience, most notably in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report released last year and news coverage of climate-induced extreme weather events, only underscores the importance of looking beyond mitigation for climate disclosures.

We hope the SEC takes our plea seriously. As we stated in our comments on the rule:

“Should adaptation reporting requirements and/or guidance be added to this proposed rule, the SEC will enormously contribute to overall U.S. climate action by drawing attention to adaptation and resilience through disclosure. Any delay in incorporating specific guidelines for adaptation and resilience disclosure in the Final Rule will be counterproductive. Now is the time to highlight the significance of adaptation, not ignore it.”

Realistically, the final rule will not balance mitigation and adaptation provisions if the SEC holds to its timeline for an April 2023 release. But the story doesn’t end there. The evidence clearly indicates that great urgency is needed to catch up on the adaptation side of climate efforts as compared to mitigation. We recognize that mitigation and adaptation are inextricably linked. To quote the hockey player Wayne Gretzky, the SEC should take note of “where the puck is going” in climate reporting. The regulated community can no longer ignore adaptation, and the lack of holistic corporate climate disclosures will not be acceptable going forward.

The SEC needs to get up to speed on adaptation and resilience rapidly. It must lead on this issue and encourage innovation and experimentation. We recommend the SEC convene a multi-stakeholder process or a series of listening sessions to become better informed on adaptation and resilience. As best practices emerge, the agency can issue guidance on adaptation metrics and the materiality of adaptation and resilience-related expenses. It could then formalize results-oriented provisions through a follow-up rulemaking or other process.

In the Biden administration’s “whole of government” approach to climate change, the SEC must play its part. The proposed rule cannot be isolated or cordoned off in its own financial silo. At this juncture, the only coherent approach addresses both mitigation and adaptation. The absence of relevant provisions in the final rule will send the wrong signal to the regulated community—one that says that adaptation and resilience need not be considered yet. But if not now, then when?

Ira Feldman is founder & board chair of the nonprofit organization Adaptation Leader.

Agency Should Reevaluate Feasibility
Author
Tiffani Lee - Holland & Knight LLP
Holland & Knight LLP
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

The Securities and Exchange Commission issued its proposed Climate-Related Disclosure Rules in an effort to address a lack of standardization in corporate reporting on climate risk. Drawing on frameworks set by the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, known as TCFD, and the Greenhouse Gas Protocol of 2001, the SEC attempted to create a disclosure framework that, as the agency said, “would provide consistent, comparable, and reliable—and therefore decision-useful—information to investors to enable them to make informed judgments about the impact of climate-related risks on current and potential investments.”

The agency has received thousands of comments on its proposal. Within those comments, certain aspects of the proposal have been criticized for failing to meet the stated objective, being overly prescriptive, or imposing considerable burden and expense on registrants. As a litigator who defended public companies and their officers and directors in securities class actions and shareholder derivative actions for many years, I believe the expressed concerns about the proposal’s Regulation S-X financial reporting requirements are warranted.

The proposal would add a new Article 14 to Regulation S-X to require disclosure of certain climate-related metrics in a footnote to a company’s audited financial statements. Broadly, the mandated metrics would consist of disaggregated climate-related impacts of severe weather events and other natural conditions, as well as transition activities on existing financial statement line items if the amount exceeds one percent of the value of the relevant line item. These financial reporting requirements would be unworkable, impractical, overly burdensome, and unlikely to result in decision-useful information for investors.

First, the proposal would require disclosures related to severe weather events, but it is unclear how a “severe weather event” will be defined. The examples provided by the SEC are largely inapplicable to many companies. There is currently no accepted standard definition and no guidance on how such a definition would or should be adjusted by relevant factors such as location, industry, or time. One can readily imagine that different industries—and different companies within a given industry—might have a range of views on what constitutes a severe weather event at a given location or point in time. Because each company would have to define the term of art in the context of its business, there would be less consistent, comparable information.

Second, the proposed one percent disclosure threshold seems somewhat arbitrary and inexplicably low. Under the proposal, the disclosure of the financial impact on a line item of the registrant’s consolidated financial statements “is not required if the sum of the absolute values of all the impacts on the line item is less than one percent of the total line item for the relevant fiscal year.” The disclosure threshold does not appear to be tied to relevant financial reporting concepts, including materiality, and it is unclear why the SEC chose to depart from the generally applicable materiality constraint on required disclosures. Not surprisingly, several commentators have urged the SEC to replace the one percent line item reporting threshold with the materiality standard typically used in financial reporting.

Third, it would likely be extremely burdensome and costly for companies to assess the threshold at the line-item level. To do so, companies would need to invest in new systems, processes, and personnel. Further, the need for internal controls and assurance associated with including this information in financial statements would require significant investments of capital, time, and attention, regardless of the disclosure threshold. Additionally, the audit costs are not knowable, because of the potentially large number of line items in the financial statements that may be impacted.

Finally, it is unclear how a company would isolate the financial impacts of severe weather and other natural conditions using any threshold. There are currently no universally accepted standards for measuring climate-related financial impacts and expenditures. Therefore, requiring companies to estimate the impacts of severe weather events is unlikely to result in comparable, decision-useful information for investors. As a result, some commentators have urged the SEC to drop the financial statement requirements altogether.

The increasing importance of climate-related information to investors and other stakeholders cannot be ignored. It is laudable that the SEC is attempting to address the lack of standardization in corporate reporting on climate risk to provide decision-useful information to investors. That said, the proposal’s financial statement requirements would present significant challenges for registrants and would not deliver comparable climate-related information. In my opinion, there is a need for further study and analysis about the best way to address financial statement disclosure of climate-related impacts.

Tiffani Lee is a partner at Holland & Knight LLP and a co-chair of its ESG practice.

Bringing Climate Issues to the Global Stage
Author
Robert Pojasek - Pojasek & Associates
Pojasek & Associates
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

The chair of the SEC, Gary Gensler, had two choices for how he could best influence the emerging field of climate financial reporting. Most readers may not be aware that by virtue of his position at the SEC, Gensler also serves as a member of the board of directors of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, or IOSCO. It’s through collaboration with this lesser-known global entity that Gensler could have focused the agency’s climate efforts—with benefits that may have spanned broader than the current SEC proposal.

IOSCO is the leading global policy forum for securities regulators and sets international standards for securities regulation. The organization counts 130 jurisdictions—or countries—in its membership, constituting more than 95 percent of global securities markets. It’s a credible, respected group that does exactly the kind of work that aligns with SEC’s climate goals: developing, implementing, and promoting globally recognized standards to build investor confidence in securities markets. Due to its cooperative nature, it also provides a useful platform for exchanging information at global and regional levels to further strengthen securities regulations.

With its new climate disclosure proposal, the SEC is setting out to do something IOSCO and the broader international community is already working on. For the past 20 years, IOSCO and the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, or IFRS, have worked together in the global accounting field. They have agreed to cooperate in developing robust financial reporting standards for climate change at a global level—and great strides have already been made.

In November 2021 at the UN climate conference in Glasgow, the IFRS launched the International Sustainability Standards Board, charged with creating IFRS sustainability disclosure standards, including for climate issues. In January, IFRS Chair Erkki Liikanen announced that ISSB would be releasing the finalized, first global standards for sustainability and climate reporting this June. Once finalized, these standards will provide a baseline of requirements that can be adopted by countries as they stand or incorporated into existing reporting policies.

Instead of moving forward with his own agency’s rulemaking process, SEC Chair Gensler could have intensified collaborations with the ongoing IOSCO efforts, to ensure that the SEC’s views and priorities were addressed in the new global standards. As a member of the board of directors, he had the option of sitting down with IOSCO to advise on the guidelines and have a say on its contents. In this scenario, new ISSB guidelines created with U.S. input, once completed, could have eventually been adopted by the U.S. government.

International guidelines like the forthcoming ISSB climate standards have major advantages over federal rules. Once adopted by nations, they can be applied across global supply chains. This is particularly important given the globalized nature of production and markets.

The other advantage of the ISSB guidelines is that they are robustly evaluated and researched, and reflect the input of securities regulators around the world. Many of IOSCO’s and other international accounting body’s guidelines are accepted as best practice and adopted in the majority of nations.

The one hiccup, however, is that any IFRS, ISSB, or IOSCO standard must be formally approved and adopted by the individual IOSCO jurisdiction. (Remember, countries are “jurisdictions.”) Given partisan battles over ESG policies, Congress is likely to be hostile to this type of regulation.

It would then appear that Chair Gensler felt that developing a rulemaking through the SEC itself would be a more effective way of tackling the climate question. That way, the agency could focus on developing a good policy that companies could follow. This could be a great contribution, but here, Gensler faces the same issue again: will the federal government let him go through with it?

U.S. agencies must similarly have legislative support to allow the use of new SEC reporting requirements. This is not likely, again due to the debate over ESG terminology. If Gensler had gone the route of working directly with IOSCO, IFRS, and ISSB instead, it’s possible there may have been a greater chance of legislative support for climate disclosure, given existing structures for partnership between the U.S. government and IOSCO.

All things considered, now may actually be a good time for Gensler to sit at the table with IOSCO, IRFS, and ISSB and double down on the United States’ cooperation at the international level. ISSB’s climate change rule will become mandatory for use in participating jurisdictions starting next year. IOSCO will be promoting the activity to maximize the number of jurisdictions that are participating.

Robert Pojasek is president of Pojasek & Associates and specializes in business sustainability and process improvement.

Exposing Gaps in Implementation and Enforcement
Author
Dottie Schindlinger - Diligent Institute
Diligent Institute
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

As publicly traded companies prepare for the SEC’s proposed rule on climate disclosures, uncertainty remains around which requirements companies will have to disclose and how those disclosures will be enforced.

Given that the proposal applies to both domestic and foreign SEC-reporting issuers, it’s imperative that processes are clearly delineated, standardized, and measurable over time. Combatting the climate crisis will require additional guidance from federal agencies, not less. On its own, the current SEC proposal won’t solve the climate crisis. A combination of actions by both the public and private sectors will be necessary to adequately curb carbon.

One potential model is Europe’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, known as CSRD, a global approach that effectively tasks all large companies—both listed and private—to report on the social and environmental risks they face, and on how their business practices affect the environment. In conjunction with the European Green Deal, the CSRD aims to equip investors, civil society organizations, and consumers with the insight necessary to analyze the sustainability performance of companies.

In contrast, not every organization will need to comply immediately with the SEC’s current proposal. We might even see a trend of public companies deciding to go private in an attempt to skirt initial requirements. But avoidance will not stave off corporate inquiries forever, nor will it prevent companies from having to comply eventually. Investors are already forming future decisions based on current or perceived ESG intel, regardless of federal requirements, as they look to identify and diversify green investment opportunities.

The proposal exposes three major gaps that organizations and the SEC will need to address: implementation, skills, and technology.

Effective implementation will require a deeper organizational restructuring of leadership roles, to tie climate to both personal and firm-wide performance evaluations. This may entail adding an ESG-focused position or new ESG goals to an existing role. Should the proposal come to pass, organizations would be required to disclose Scopes 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions, and some would need to include Scope 3 emissions if deemed financially material. However, vast differences among company ESG policies makes it difficult to compare between companies and hold them accountable. For these reasons and more, the SEC will likely not require companies to comply with scope 3 until implementation gaps are addressed.

The proposal also reveals gaps in skills. It calls for a refocusing of corporate skillsets to include overseeing ESG initiatives. Boards and directors will be held accountable for ESG progress and therefore will need to develop the expertise necessary to create sustainable growth strategies. New training and certification programs must prioritize climate risk and ESG fundamentals, tying business success to ongoing ESG efforts.

Finally, improvements in technology are needed to measure and achieve new sustainability benchmarks. Organizations will need software that can track their carbon emissions and maintain a database that encompasses information from across their value chain. They will also need to report this data in a consistent and standardized fashion—especially if the only tools in use are spreadsheets. Most organizations will likely need to make new investments to future-proof ongoing ESG initiatives, including new technology. Before these investments are made, companies need to analyze their current suite of tools to better understand how existing or new technology can help enable higher quality measurements.

On a positive note, the SEC proposal aligns with the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, known as TCFD, the de facto foundation for all three major global climate reporting proposals that exist today: the SEC rule, Europe’s CSRD, and the International Sustainability Standards. Encouragingly, the SEC proposal will certainly increase accountability for environmental impacts.

It’s important to note that today’s SEC climate rule would have traditionally taken decades to create and gone through endless rounds of federal proposals. We should consider this bureaucratic expediency a win. Furthermore, the technological advancements made over the last decade have equipped investors with reputable climate-disclosure information, enabling them to make holistic investment decisions regardless of any new requirements. This demonstrates the importance of climate as a component of future financial decisions and why this proposal is so timely.

Curtailing the environmental crisis presents a strong opportunity for leadership driven by international organizations and the global community. The focus should be on taking immediate action, not shaming companies that traditionally have been slower to innovate. While some may say that the SEC proposal is none of their business, the future of the planet is everyone’s business.

Dottie Schindlinger is executive director of Diligent Institute, which works to inform, educate, and connect leaders to champion modern governance.

Creating Order Out of Chaos
Author
Kristina Wyatt - Persefoni
Persefoni
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

It would be hard to work in sustainability without being a determined optimist. Luckily, developments in the global regulatory reporting landscape over the last two years give me significant hope.

To appreciate the importance of the SEC’s climate proposal, we need to consider its place in the broader international context. Thinking back to 2021, which feels like ancient history, the sustainability reporting landscape was crowded, confusing, and fragmented.

Market participants’ views of what companies should report concerning sustainability or ESG issues varied widely, as did their views on what those terms even meant. Investors were not receiving the consistent, comparable, reliable information they needed to evaluate and factor sustainability matters into their investment decisions. Companies, for their part, were mired in an alphabet soup of different reporting standards that sought, in disparate ways, to sort out the information investors were looking for.

This fragmentation created confusion, wasted effort, and, worst of all, an uneven playing field for investors. ESG raters sought to satisfy investors’ demands by piling questionnaires on issuers. The raters then sold their assessments to investors who could afford these services. Small investors, for their part, did not have access to the same data. This informational asymmetry reflected a market failure.

Things changed in 2021. Securities regulators around the world—independently and through the International Organization of Securities Commissions, or IOSCO—saw the need for clear, harmonized sustainability reporting rules. At the same time, the alphabet soup of independent standard setters—including the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), and Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB)—formed an alliance to develop prototype standards that could inform global regulatory reporting requirements.

As the alliance worked on its prototype, the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, known as IFRS, formed an International Sustainability Standards Board, or ISSB, to develop guidelines that would provide a global baseline to inform jurisdictional sustainability reporting requirements. The ISSB issued its draft standards early in 2022, drawing on the work of the alliance.

It was against this backdrop that the SEC issued its climate disclosure proposal in March 2022. During this time, international regulators regularly collaborated to inform the shaping of the ISSB and the alliance’s prototype. The SEC proposal closely aligns with the ISSB’s draft climate reporting standards and brings hope for global regulatory convergence.

What does this mean for companies and investors? Global alignment will reduce reporting fragmentation, where companies are required to report different information in different jurisdictions. It will also help investors gain access to more consistent and comparable data, even as they invest in companies operating in various countries. The global markets will operate more efficiently, and the aggregate burden on companies and investors will be reduced.

This convergence is critical from a process perspective. But what of the substance of the ISSB and SEC climate proposals? How sound are they, and how will they lay the foundation for further sustainability reporting on other topics in the future?

Here again, I’m hopeful. The SEC’s proposed rule, like the ISSB standards, build on two well-established foundations: the Greenhouse Gas Protocol and the Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, known as TCFD.

The GHG Protocol defines how companies measure and report their emissions. It establishes the methodology for calculating direct emissions from a company’s operations (called Scope 1 emissions), indirect emissions from the generation of electricity the company purchases (Scope 2), and other indirect emissions throughout the company’s value chain (Scope 3). The TCFD provides a logical framework to assist companies in evaluating and reporting on how climate risks translate into financial risks.

The SEC rule would require uniform disclosure of companies’ Scopes 1 and 2 emissions as well as certain companies’ Scope 3 emissions. This would give investors the comparable data they need to understand climate-related transition risks.

The agency’s proposal also incorporates the pillars of the TCFD framework. These provide a mechanism for companies to explain how their governance structures support oversight of climate-related risks, how they evaluate and manage those risks, and how they measure their progress.

By providing companies with a clear set of rules, built on the same foundation as international standards, the SEC will help create order and guide better management and reporting of climate-related financial risks. As the world moves on to address other sustainability topics, such as biodiversity, nature, human rights, and other issues, we will have a model in the climate rules.

Kristina Wyatt is deputy general counsel and senior vice president of global regulatory climate disclosure at Persefoni.

Opportunities, Gained and Missed, in the SEC’s Proposed Climate Rule
Author
Andrew Behar - As You Sow
Ira Feldman - Adaptation Leader
Tiffani Lee - Holland & Knight LLP
Robert Pojasek - Pojasek & Associates
Dottie Schindlinger - Diligent Institute
Kristina Wyatt - Persefoni
As You Sow
Adaptation Leader
Holland & Knight LLP
Pojasek & Associates
Diligent Institute
Persefoni
Current Issue
Issue
2
The Debate: The New Toxic Substances Control Act Is Now Five Years Old: A Report

Last year, the Securities & Exchange Commission published a proposed rule on climate disclosure that would require registrants to provide certain climate-related information in their registration statements and annual reports. The proposed rule requires “information about a registrant’s climate-related risks that are reasonably likely to have a material impact on its business, results of operations, or financial condition.” A final rule is expected later this year.

Certain issues raised in the proposed rule have garnered much attention, such as the disclosure of Scope 3 emissions, which we covered in an earlier debate. But the appearance of this SEC proposal raises a number of other important topics. They relate to ESG disclosure generally (both voluntary and mandatory) and climate risk disclosure (as a subset of ESG or sustainability disclosure). Its possible effects call into question the relationship between the SEC proposal and other pending international proposals from bodies like the International Sustainability Standards Board.

We ask a panel of experts: Was the alignment of the proposal with the TCFD framework (Task Force on Climate-related Disclosure) appropriate? What provisions included in the proposed rule prompt optimism or concern? Should the overall scope of the proposed rule have been broader than climate risk, for example the full scope of ESG or sustainability reporting, as others had proposed in prior petitions to the SEC? And were there other aspects of climate disclosure that were excluded or could have been better addressed?

THE DEBATE Last year, the Securities & Exchange Commission published a proposed rule on climate disclosure that would require “information about a registrant’s climate-related risks that are reasonably likely to have a material impact on its business, results of operations, or financial condition.” A final rule is expected later this year, but first our panel has some comments.

Scope 3 Emissions and the Future of Corporate Climate Accountability
Author
Ann Goodman - CUNY Advanced Science Research Center
Pankaj Bhatia - World Resources Institute
Stephen Harper - Intel Corporation
Corinne Snow - Vinson & Elkins LLP
Paul Davies - Latham & Watkins LLP
CUNY Advanced Science Research Center
World Resources Institute
Intel Corporation
Vinson & Elkins LLP
Latham & Watkins LLP
Current Issue
Issue
1
The Debate: The New Toxic Substances Control Act Is Now Five Years Old: A Report

For companies with complex supply chains, tracking greenhouse gas emissions poses a unique challenge. The GHG Protocol, a set of international standards for measuring and managing greenhouse gases, categorizes emissions into three scopes. Scope 1 emissions concern GHG sources directly controlled by a company, while Scope 2 covers emissions from purchased energy. Scope 3 emissions, on the other hand, arise from indirect upstream and downstream activities in a company’s value chain.

Last year, the Securities and Exchange Commission released a draft rule that would require companies to disclose their Scope 3 emissions if they are “material” to operations. They often encompass the majority of a company’s total GHG emissions, and can include supply chain emissions, employees commuting and working from home, product use emissions, and more. As a result of new regulations and ambitious voluntary goals, companies are increasingly facing pressure to manage their indirect Scope 3 emissions in addition to Scopes 1 and 2.

A relatively new practice, tracking Scope 3 emissions will require collaboration between stakeholders to ensure that accounting is effective. What best practices should corporations follow? What are the challenges surrounding Scope 3 identification and reporting? And how can companies overcome these challenges?

In October, ELI holds an annual Corporate Forum to explore challenges in the sector. In 2022, the forum brought together experts from a variety of backgrounds to debate reducing value chain impacts.

The Corporate Forum

Ann Goodman, Author, Adapting to Change: The Business of Climate Resilience and Collaborating for Climate Resilience: Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions are becoming increasingly important as the world is plagued by war, energy crises, droughts, fires, storms, and all manner of disasters. A focus on climate change is front and center to everyone from policymakers to companies to ordinary people. Organizations must now reduce their greenhouse gas emissions not just from direct sources, but also from indirect ones, referred to as Scope 3 emissions. These emissions are a huge issue environmentally as well as economically. With us today is a distinguished group of panelists to discuss best practices in this rapidly growing field. I’d like to invite Pankaj to speak first, as the World Resources Institute created the original Scope 3 emissions protocol and continues to be heavily involved in its evolution.

Pankaj Bhatia, Acting Director, Climate; Global Director, GHG Protocol, World Resources Institute: The Scope 3 terminology was introduced in 2001, in the first edition of the GHG Protocol that came out in the same year. Few know that the Scope’s framework was first used by BP, which had started applying this concept internally to organize their greenhouse gas inventory.

In simple terms, I would say the Scope 3 framework is a lifecycle accounting approach, where we are trying to account for the full range of emissions that a company would have upstream, on the production side, and downstream.

Traditionally, the approach was to focus on production. One example is the toxic release inventory, one of the most well-known accounting programs, in which, for example, you only focus on facility-level emissions that come from your smokestack.

In the absence of effective policies to control greenhouse gas emissions, we intended the Scope 1, 2, and 3 frameworks to introduce a strong incentive mechanism to hold companies accountable to the full range of their impacts. In that context, it was well understood that many companies have opportunities to undertake ambitious climate action, not just for what one would call Scope 1—emissions from production—but also Scope 2, which are emissions from energy use. That is one of the biggest sources of emissions, so if we only focus on Scope 1, we are missing those opportunities.

We can better explain the purpose of Scope 3 by looking at the example of an oil and gas company. If we were to hold such a company accountable only for their production emissions, we wouldn’t be asking them to control what happens when fossil fuels are used. They might say those emissions are the responsibility of customers. The Scope 3 framework recognizes that there are multiple parties who are responsible for a given category of Scope 3 emissions.

We never say that only oil and gas companies should be held accountable for their product’s use and emissions. Consumers also share responsibility. But we do say that companies should be held accountable, because they play a key role. And there are tremendous opportunities for companies to take action and make business decisions that can have a ripple effect throughout the value chain.

Now, Scope 3 has gained increasing levels of attention for many reasons. First, since the Scope 3 standard was published in 2011, there has been a lot of progress. There have always been some concerns raised about the difficulty of Scope 3 accounting. I completely agree, but the level of difficulty varies across sectors. For example, an oil and gas company should not make a public claim that Scope 3 accounting is very difficult. Even a high school student can calculate their Scope 3 emissions, because for the oil and gas industry, Scope 3 emissions are simply a function of how much they are selling and the emission factor of their products.

If only the oil and gas sector were accounting for Scope 3 emissions, I think the framework would have served its purpose. But the industry is still not doing it, even though it is not difficult for them. But there are many other sectors where calculating Scope 3 emissions is indeed challenging. One example is information technology, or the IT sector. Given the range of products and services that the IT sector offers, Scope 3 accounting would require a lot more thought, capacity, and resources. The retail sector also sells millions of products. While Scope 3 accounting is not going to be easy for retail, it is still going to be a very important and worthwhile exercise.

Policymakers should recognize this difference in capacities to account for Scope 3 emissions. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently adopted some draft rules related to Scope 3 that are undergoing finalization. If the SEC were to make Scope 3 a required reporting category, I think it would be a big step forward. But the commission may need to be thoughtful about which sectors to prioritize, in terms of their economic and environmental significance, as well as their capacity to quantify such emissions.

Stephen Harper, Global Director, Environment and Energy Policy, Intel Corporation: At Intel, we’ve been working on reducing our Scope 1 and 2 emissions for over 20 years.

Scope 3 is incredibly important to us. We issued a commitment to reduce our Scope 3 emissions substantially by 2030, just before the SEC rule came out. Our Scope 3 emissions make up 90 percent of our total footprint, divided between upstream and downstream. Eighty percent of that 90 percent comes from downstream. As for upstream operations, we have 9,000 tier-one suppliers in 87 countries. We are working on incorporating the biggest and the most important of these suppliers into the Climate Disclosure Project. We also have a rigorous supplier qualification process, which considers not just impacts on climate and the environment, but also labor, conflict minerals, and other areas.

Our biggest suppliers are receiving pressure from us and their other costumers to reduce their Scope 1 and 2 emissions—but it’s going to be difficult. Our industry trade association, the Semiconductor Industry Association, and SEMI, a large trade association of companies that make the machinery and chemicals we use, have just launched an initiative to standardize how our suppliers do accounting for Scopes 1 and 2. We’re hoping that that will improve things dramatically.

Downstream is where the challenges are going to be greater. McKinsey and the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy have found that the information and communications technology sector enables the saving of more energy than it is responsible for consuming. That happens through smart buildings and smart homes.

The data center is the hub of this network that produces huge net energy efficiency savings. But the greenhouse gas footprint of the data center sector needs to be as small as possible, and it needs to be powered by renewable energy as much as possible. We’re 100 percent renewably powered in our operations in the United States and 80 percent worldwide. We want our customers, particularly the data center operators, to be 100 percent renewable as well. So that’s one challenge.

Another challenge is figuring out how much energy is consumed by machines that contain our products, because we don’t sell directly to the consumer. When we try to estimate the energy consumed and associated greenhouse gas emissions caused by machines that are powered by our central processing units (CPUs), whether it’s in data centers or businesses that use laptops and desktops, it’s very difficult because we don’t know where those machines are located.

Our customers, such as Dell and Lenovo, are the ones that sell to individual customers. We rely on them to tell us as best they can where their products are being sold. Then we have to figure out the emissions factor, which means the greenhouse gas intensity of virtually every grid in the world. That’s difficult because even in the United States, we don’t know on a real-time basis the greenhouse gas intensity of the grid in most places.

We are also thinking a lot about what many people call Scope 4, which are sometimes described as avoided emissions. For example, if we sell chips to Johnson Controls or Schneider Electric, and they sell an energy efficiency solution to an industrial enterprise that improves their energy efficiency and reduces their Scope 1, who gets credit for that? We are not claiming that we are going to take credit for it. Schneider Electric or Johnson Controls probably won’t take credit for that—the end customer most likely will. But we want to be able to estimate that handprint.

We’re working with ACEEE to develop methods to measure this handprint, because we want to use that as part of the value proposition in selling our products and helping our customers sell their products. There’s been a lot of controversy about whether Scope 4 is legitimate or not. It needs to be nailed down in terms of what it can encompass and what it looks like.

Finally, we’re coordinating with the Department of Energy and state energy agencies to make sure that when money is spent for the bipartisan infrastructure package and the Inflation Reduction Act, the government is adopting digital technology strategies—and not just funding insulation and double-glazed windows. Digitalization offers many benefits that only recently are being recognized by policymakers.

Corinne Snow, Counsel, Vinson & Elkins LLP: I’ll talk broadly about the types of conversations that we are now having with clients about Scope 3. Many of these discussions have been prompted by the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rules, which would require companies to disclose their Scope 3 emissions in their annual filings if “material” or if they have been voluntarily disclosing them already.

In thinking about Scope 3 and what your company should be doing, I think the first question to ask is: Why are you disclosing Scope 3? Is it because you have an obligation under a regulatory requirement? Is it because you have stakeholder pressure to do so—or is it because you think it’s the right thing to do? The answer could be all three, or any one of those three. But starting with that question helps determine how you’re going to calculate Scope 3 and how to share that information. And if you decided to share that information as a public company, there’s an increasing likelihood that you will have additional regulatory requirements.

The biggest piece of advice I would give is to only commit to what you can actually do, and check with your operational folks before you make those commitments. One reason is these emissions reductions targets—like going net zero by 2050—often started as aspirational goals. Yet now, these commitments are quickly becoming regulatory requirements as agencies like the SEC or the Federal Trade Commission get involved. They may investigate what they call greenwashing claims, which they say are false advertisements about becoming more environmentally friendly.

Sustainability used to be the realm of public relations. Now, it is much more interdisciplinary: your sustainability folks need to be talking to your legal folks, who need to be talking to your operational folks to understand what is involved in calculating emissions. I would respectfully disagree that calculating Scope 3 emissions is a simple task for companies like those in the oil and gas industry. Even calculating Scope 1 emissions poses challenges, particularly as these scopes are starting to get defined and the accuracy that’s required evolves in regulatory requirements.

I’ll give you an example. Many oil and gas companies have had to submit mandatory reporting to EPA for a number of years under the Clean Air Act Subpart W—and that’s only for specific facilities. Broadly, companies are submitting their best estimates to EPA, and then working with the agency to refine the numbers after these initial estimates. Those estimates begin with looking at the types of equipment you have and the emissions that are likely to come out of those. But then you have to go back on a more granular level and ask specific questions. For example, was any of that equipment offline for part of the year? Did we have any shutdowns? Did we have any leaks anywhere? And this process only encompasses Scope 1 emission for covered facilities.

Accounting for all emissions is a much broader task. One of my clients was trying to figure out the greenhouse gas emissions from leaf blowers used on their properties. Given all the miscellaneous ways your company uses fuel throughout mundane processes, such as travel for your employees, how are you going to calculate estimates that are accurate enough to report to an entity like the SEC? As just one example, what if somebody thought they were going to take a flight, but their flight got cancelled and they used a different airline or had to take a train instead? You would need to reconfigure those numbers if you’re going to accurately determine emissions. And that’s a real challenge.

While aspirational goals are useful, I would suggest that at a certain point resources are finite. How much time and energy are we putting into disclosure of information that may or may not be accurate or readily comparable between companies?

Scope 3 in particular poses real challenges. If you think about it, your Scope 3 emissions are everybody else’s Scope 1. You then need to worry about how accurate everybody else in your value chain is about their own emissions as well. You would even be potentially accountable to a regulator like the SEC for how accurate those emissions are. Can you reach that level of comfort with uncertainty? If not, are you just buying your company a lot of potential litigation risks? And are you just supporting a bunch of cottage industries that try to calculate numbers in the most accurate way, rather than perhaps putting those resources to better use by more directly addressing the larger climate issue?

Paul Davies, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP: I agree that the GHG Protocol and Scope 3 will have significant roles to play in carbon accounting going forward. I want to start with discussing accuracy of data, which continues to be a significant challenge globally. If you extrapolate the earlier example of leaf blowers, you can look at how that applies to broader value chains around the world, and the challenges that companies have in collecting data from third parties. That’s why initiatives like the Partnership for Carbon Transparency, or PACT, are incredibly important. There needs to be more certainty in this data.

But more fundamentally, I think we need to start with the question of how to use Scope 3 reporting. For example, the GHG Protocol acknowledges that using Scope 3 as a “metric” doesn’t lend itself well to comparing companies with other companies. That’s a point we need to reflect on.

Look at for example the 15 subcategories in Scope 3. You often find companies within the same sector reporting to different subcategories. The result is you get very different results when you compare one company to another.

Double counting is another issue. The GHG Protocol acknowledges that double counting is an inherent aspect of Scope 3 accounting. But to echo some of this panel’s earlier points, if you’re going to be held accountable for your Scope 3 emissions, then double counting strikes me as a challenge.

In terms of what’s happening internationally, the International Sustainability Standards Board recently announced that they would report on Scope 3 emissions. But they also acknowledge that “there is going to be a need to provide protections for companies in relation to Scope 3 emissions.”

The Bank Policy Institute has also acknowledged that reporting Scope 3 emissions would undermine risk-based investment decisions and create an overly aggressive international baseline. While we are seeing a movement toward more Scope 3 emissions reporting internationally, for a number of the reasons given by this panel, there are significant concerns associated with the integrity of the data and how that data is being used.

To echo earlier points, there are changes and refinements being made to the GHG Protocol, such as the draft standard on land use change and carbon removals, which is a very welcome addition. And there is further work being done on Scope 3. Avoided emissions/Scope 4 is another active area of interest among companies.

Ann Goodman: I’d like to start by asking the panelists if they have any questions or comments for their fellow panelists.

Stephen Harper: When I was young, I worked in the oil and gas industry. I worked for Amoco Oil, which is now BP U.S., in their fuel regulatory program. I wholeheartedly concur with your comments that it’s not necessarily that easy to calculate Scope 3 even in a more straightforward sector like oil and gas compared to a sector like IT.

I will say, however, that this is one of my favorite axes to grind. When EPA issued their initial and subsequent revision to the greenhouse gas reporting rule, the U.S. semiconductor industry was responsible for something like 0.06 percent of total U.S. industrial greenhouse gas emissions, according to EPA’s inventory. The agency came out with a draft rule that would have cost us tens of millions in the first year and then a smaller percentage of that going forward.

The oil and gas industry in this case got to take advantage of its simplicity because they were allowed to use the mass balance approach, which doesn’t require much money at all. So you have a sector with huge emissions, the oil and gas industry, being able to do very simple calculations, and a sector with extremely small emissions, the semiconductor industry, having to go into great detail with its accounting. The expense and difficulty vary by regulatory regime. But on the double counting issue, I agree it will be an important topic to parse out because it’s unavoidable.

Pankaj Bhatia: On the point on how easy or difficult it is, I think we agree that Scope 3 is going to be a challenge for most sectors. But for the oil and gas sector, which was highlighted, I think the reporting doesn’t depend on equipment. It depends on how much fuel they consume. It doesn’t matter which equipment was closed or not working because it’s a very, very simple calculation for at least this sector. For the same type of emissions, that is also true for other sectors.

From a historical point of view, the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard was introduced for the first time in 2001, so we’ve been using this for about 21 years. In comparison, the financial accounting standard took more than a hundred years to reach its current state, and even now we can see that those standards are not perfect.

As mentioned by other panelists, whether we like it or not, the Scope 3 standard is going to be here for years to come. Initiatives all over the world and all the leading universities in the United States are now working on Scope 3 issues.

I sometimes use the analogy of penicillin, the first antibiotic introduced in the world more than a hundred years ago. We don’t use penicillin anymore, but we use antibiotics because there is a purpose and value in that concept. That worked in the past, but we continued to evolve. In a way, Scope 3 reporting is the first antibiotic we have introduced. It’s supposed to help us fight some of the illnesses we are facing with respect to climate. It’s not a perfect antibiotic; it has side effects. But it is the beginning of a journey. I think it will get there, but we will all have to work together on this.

Paul Davies: I absolutely agree that Scope 3 is here to stay. We all need to work on identifying the challenges associated with Scope 3 and work out how best to address those going forward. It isn’t perfect; and I think one of the key issues is that it’s being used in ways that may have never been envisaged when Scope 3 was first developed.

Corinne Snow: Even if you accept that Scope 3 is a useful framework in terms of helping individual companies figure out how to limit greenhouse gases, I think one problem is we assume a level of accuracy of these numbers that just isn’t available right now. If we obsess over the specificity and accuracy of that number, we might lose track of the larger goal here, which is to limit greenhouse gas emissions, including through value chains, and not just through individual company operations.

Ann Goodman: It seems that in calculating Scope 3 emissions, a number of different participants need to work well together. That includes working internally within a company, and externally with other companies and entities. Can the panelists here speak to how companies address that need?

Stephen Harper: I can speak from the perspective of a company that is struggling with that as we speak. For example, with our 9,000 suppliers, we could get very different data from all of them based on very different methodologies. We’re not going to chase down the 9,000th supplier. We’re going to focus on the big ones—the ones that are most strategically important to our company. But we’re working with those suppliers to make sure that we’re developing a common approach, so that when we get Scope 1 and 2 numbers from supplier A, who’s in the same business as supplier B, those two numbers are apples to apples. That’s going to take time, and it’s going to be difficult because, in many cases, a lot of these companies are not U.S.-based companies. They’re based in Asia. We may or may not be a huge customer for them, but our industry is, and that’s why we have to standardize the approach.

A similar issue we have faced very successfully is conflict minerals. Our industry is a relatively small user of conflict minerals compared to, for example, the auto industry or the jewel industry. But activists came after two companies on this issue, Apple and Intel, because of our brands. We took it on as a challenge well ahead of any government requirements for reporting, which exist now, and forced the industry and suppliers to develop a methodology to trace essentially every ounce of precious minerals and metals that we use in our products. That’s a problem we have largely solved, even though there are five or six steps in the supply chain between a mine and our factory gate.

During this process, it’s important to have some empathy for the suppliers. The last thing in the world the suppliers need is to get a different questionnaire requiring a different methodology from hundreds of customers. That is a recipe for disaster. That’s why, in conflict minerals, we tried to standardize it, and that’s what we’re trying to do throughout our industry.

A good example of where this concept worked for other environmental purposes is in the auto industry, which has developed a common database for all of the suppliers the big auto companies use. It enables companies to get data that’s developed on a consistent basis, and the suppliers aren’t driven crazy with ten different regimes.

Corinne Snow: Steve makes an important point about the impacts this has on the supply chain and new suppliers. If public companies need to get accurate information from their suppliers so they can meet their own inventory obligations, there’s certainly going to be winners and losers on the supplier side.

Bluntly, smaller companies will struggle with this more, because they are less likely to have the in-house resources or to be able to afford consultants to measure their Scope 1 emissions with the precision and accuracy that companies like Intel will be asking from them in the future.

Paul Davies: I think consistent methodology is critically important, especially for streamlining requests. We hear time and time again from clients about how frustrating it is to receive multiple questionnaires, and the waste in time and resources involved. Sharing best practices is very important. That’s why initiatives like PACT are crucial.

Pankaj Bhatia: I agree. We’re not here to count beans. Accounting is supposed to be a means to an end; it is not an end itself. We are still experiencing the evolution of the standard, and the concurrent evolution of the capabilities of companies to undertake accounting. Sector by sector, commodity by commodity, or category by category standardization need to take place. This is going to take some time.

We also have the opportunity to address these issues. Paul mentioned that the GHG Protocol will begin a process to update the Scope 3 standard and guidance. Generally, we think the standard itself has been stable. While we have not seen a need to significantly revise the 15 categories framework, we would like to have feedback on this process. We also have identified topics that need to be further addressed, like finance emissions, Category 15, which is becoming a very important category, and how to, for example, address the issue of cash held by companies in banks. There’s no guidance on that issue currently.

Some guidance on sub-categorization within these categories may help address the issue of accuracy and significance for different sectors. We are also hoping that the SEC comes up with robust guidelines and safeguards. If they don’t, Scope 3 will not be seen as an accurate inventory for many sectors.

Corinne Snow: SEC has put in place some safeguards against SEC enforcement, but those don’t protect you from shareholder suits—you can still get sued by people who buy your stock for inaccurate disclosures.

Paul Davies: I think the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive in Europe helps encapsulate this very nicely. While requiring Scope 3 emissions, the CSRD says that they shall take account of the difficulties that undertakings may encounter in gathering information from actors throughout their value chains, especially from those that are not obliged to report under CSRD. So on one hand, it’s acknowledging the role that Scope 3 and reporting against Scope 3 has. But it also acknowledges some of the difficulties associated with collecting, using, and reporting that data.

Stephen Harper: I’d like to echo the earlier point made that we’re only 20 years into the evolution and refinement of the GHG Protocol, as opposed to a one hundred year-old financial accounting system. I recently watched a great documentary about Enron called The Smartest Guys in the Room. Enron managed to get a clean audit throughout many years of financial manipulation and outright thievery while using the rules of this hundred-year old financial accounting system. My point is that there’s always going to be ways to game the system. While the system gets improved over time, we also need to look out for instances of egregious misuse.

The last thing I’ll say on the accounting and reporting front is that Scope 4 is very important to us and to other industries. We’d like to use the enabling effect of our products and our customers’ products as part of the value proposition to sell these solutions. But the other reason we want to estimate these avoided emissions and put it in our reports is we think it’s important to investors. We believe investors will value companies that are not just reducing their own emissions, but are also selling solutions to other companies to lower their footprint.

Ann Goodman: Any other comments or questions from our panelists?

Pankaj Bhatia: I’ll add one more point on Scope 4 or avoided emissions. Scopes have been designed for an inventory framework—so Scope 1, Scope 2, Scope 3 all represent an inventory impact. This is a technical term, but the point is they complete the full lifecycle or series of impacts for a company. But avoided emissions are not the same as inventory impacts. When you want to quantify avoided emissions from your products, you compare what would have happened if your product was not introduced. What was the alternative? That question gets into a different kind of approach. That has been one hesitation, at least from the GHG Protocol standpoint, to use Scope 4 as a label for avoided emissions.

Another difficulty is that even with the best of rules, there are always some players who will find ways to game the system. We are worried about cherry picking when it comes to avoided emissions. Companies may decide to highlight and focus on good things that they’re doing, but that might just be the tip of the iceberg. They may be obscuring the far greater number of bad things going on underneath.

In a system, how do you enforce a voluntary standard where, when you speak about or claim good things, you are also held accountable for things that are not so good going on in your business? We would very much welcome feedback and guidance on how to think about this issue.

Corinne Snow: Sometimes that’s based on the presumption that you even know how your products are going to be used. Going back to the oil and gas example we discussed earlier, a lot of these products are bought and sold on spot markets. You don’t actually know where your product is going. It’s a fungible commodity and it doesn’t all get burnt, or it may not all get burnt for the same purposes. Some of these fossil fuels are used to make petrochemicals, which include plastics that may be used to produce parts of wind turbines for energy.

That’s a specific example, but I think it’s true for every single product out there. At the end of the day, you are speculating the actual footprint of your product. You don’t know who your ultimate customer is in most situations or how they are going to use your product. That means you need to make guesses. Difficulties arise when you also need to comply with specific regulatory requirements on the accuracy of these scopes.

Paul Davies: If the overall objective is to reduce global emissions, then absolutely there is a role for Scope 4/avoided emissions. In the same way as the original architecture around the 2001 GHG Protocol has evolved, the views and the objectives of Scope 4 have changed and will continue to develop. Companies are currently engaging in an active debate on the importance of recording avoided emissions, and the role that avoided emissions will ultimately have in reducing global emissions.

Ann Goodman: We will now turn to our audience for questions.

Ethan Shenkman, Partner, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP: I’m Ethan Shenkman with Arnold & Porter. Can you explain more the difference between Scope 3 and Scope 4? I think the concept of Scope 4 emissions, or avoided emissions, is important. If the goal is to incentivize the creation of new technologies that enable greater emissions reductions, then why shouldn’t this accounting system fully capture and reward those efforts?

At the same time, because Scope 3 emissions are so broad, do they already capture Scope 4 emissions? In some sense, your Scope 3 emissions are other companies’ Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions. Therefore, if you enable companies upstream or downstream to lower their Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, aren’t you already lowering your Scope 3 emissions? I’m trying to understand better why it would be necessary to define a new scope to fully capture the benefits of and incentivize these technologies.

Pankaj Bhatia: You’ve arrived at the key point of distinction. The greenhouse gas inventory of a company is a subset of the global system of all companies. There is a value chain system of a company, and then there is everything that happens outside that system. You can use Scopes 1, 2, and 3 to capture all the emissions that will happen in the value chain of a company.

A company does not have any emissions outside the value chain. But you used a word at the end of your question that captures the point we are trying to understand: benefits. A company can have benefits or liabilities in terms of emissions outside its value chain. So while a company doesn’t have any emissions outside its value chain, it can have an effect—specifically, a market effect. If Intel were to introduce a product that is very efficient, it will of course be able to capture emissions from that product in its value chain and Scopes 1, 2, and 3. But that product will also begin to have a market effect—it will begin to displace inefficient products over a period of time.

That’s what some companies would like to capture because they are creating an impact by introducing more efficient products and displacing less efficient products in the market. These market effects are happening outside their value chain in the broader system. There is a desire to be able to account for those effects because they are meaningful. We provide a methodology in the GHG Protocol to account for those effects, which are called avoided emissions or market benefits.

Stephen Harper: From our perspective, we are not advocating that a new Scope 4, Scope 5, and Scope 6 should be created. We are not so much worried about market impacts or trying to track those. We just want to be able to take credit for direct impacts with our customers and our customer’s customers.

There is some tension between trying to get things as accurate as possible so that, if you look at a number that comes from a company, it means something, and simplicity.

I don’t think this could ever truly be simple, but if you get to the point of having to chase every decimal point and needing to divert resources from actual climate mitigation or other actions that would be of material value to your customers, then you have gone too far. Whether for regulatory or investment purposes, we as a climate community need to figure out where the sweet spot is between accuracy and simplicity. TEF

THE DEBATE Last year, the Securities and Exchange Commission released a draft rule that would require companies to disclose their Scope 3 emissions if they are “material” to operations. They often encompass the majority of a company’s total GHG emissions, and can include supply chain emissions, employees commuting and working from home, product use emissions, and more. Five experts evaluate opportunities up and down the value chain as corporations look beyond their operations.

Helping Clients With Voluntary Cuts on the Road to “Net Zero”
Author
Ethan Shenkman - Arnold & Porter
Arnold & Porter
Current Issue
Issue
1
Ethan Shenkman

Many practitioners are helping their corporate clients navigate the increasingly complicated landscape relating to voluntary reduction of greenhouse gases and “net zero” commitments. According to the UN’s Net Zero Tracker database, 40 percent (or 799) of the world’s largest publicly traded corporations have net-zero targets, up from 617 one year ago. Indeed, climate leadership from the private sector is more important than ever, as evidenced by the Race to Zero and Race to Resilience initiatives for non-state actors showcased at COP 27, the annual conference of the climate convention.

Companies are facing encouragement, as well as increasing scrutiny, from a wide variety of stakeholders, including regulators, international bodies, shareholders, institutional investors, customers, and NGOs. Because there is no single standard, set of definitions, or oversight body to govern voluntary GHG reduction goals, practitioners are advising their clients to approach these issues thoughtfully and with sufficient resources and expertise, and subject to internal governance systems.

Last year, for example, the UN secretary general launched a High-level Expert Group to “develop stronger and clearer standards” for net-zero pledges by non-state actors. During the leadup to COP 27, it issued its report, “Integrity Matters: Net Zero Commitments by Businesses, Financial Institutions, Cities and Regions.” Among other things, the report recommends that net-zero pledges from non-state actors should be in line with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s scenarios limiting warming to 1.5 degrees—which means reaching net zero by 2050. The report also suggests interim targets every five years starting in 2025, and covering all greenhouse gases.

In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed rule on “Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors” requires registrants that have set climate-related targets or goals to disclose them. Specifically, the proposal requires the registrant to reveal the scope of emissions included in the target, the unit of measurement (e.g., absolute or intensity), the time horizon for the target, the baseline time period, any interim targets, and how the registrant intends to meet the goals.

And in a potentially significant development relating to government contracting, the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council recently proposed a rule that would require major federal contractors to develop science-based targets to reduce GHG emissions and have their targets validated by SBTi, the Science Based Targets Initiative.

For practitioners and sustainability advisors working closely with their clients in crafting voluntary GHG-reduction goals, there are many legal and technical issues to address. These include which types of emissions will be covered, what the corporate and geographic limitations of the commitment are, how emissions will be measured, where and how the company reports its goals and progress, and the baseline level of ambition and pace of reductions. Whether the commitment will include a net-zero pledge, and how “net zero” will be defined are also major concerns.

Another question is whether the company will seek to align its targets with scenarios that are consistent with the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals, and how alignment will be determined. Companies will also have to determine to what extent carbon offsets can be counted and under what conditions. A final issue concerns transparency, verification, and accountability: what type of oversight exists for these commitments? Are there sufficient internal systems in place?

While some stakeholders argue that companies are not going far enough in pledging to reduce their carbon footprints, others contend these pledges are going too far. Leading Republicans in the House of Representatives, for example, have promised vigorous oversight in the new Congress on what they perceive to be an overreaction from the private sector to “politically correct” investing, at the expense of shareholder value. Representative Patrick McHenry of North Carolina, the incoming chair of the House Financial Services Committee, has criticized the administration for inappropriately “pushing its climate agenda through financial regulators.” Similarly, attorneys general from 24 states have argued that an overly broad climate disclosure rule would run afoul of the major questions doctrine, which the Supreme Court recently articulated in West Virginia v. EPA as a limitation on assertions of sweeping regulatory authority. Some congressional members have gone so far as to suggest that corporate ESG efforts could violate antitrust laws.

Needless to say, practitioners will be following these developments closely in 2023 and beyond.

Helping Clients With Voluntary Cuts on the Road to “Net Zero”

Time for Environmental Crimes
Author
Rena Steinzor - University of Maryland Carey Law School
University of Maryland Carey Law School
Current Issue
Issue
3

Criminal prosecution for major regulatory offenses, for a while the norm and then the exception, is once again on the rise. Government officials, facing dwindling enforcement budgets, are hauling malfeasant corporations and their executives into court to face charges.