The Fall of Cast Iron and the Rise of Industrial Regulation
Author
Stephen R. Dujack - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
6

When the Forum’s Akielly Hu profiled civil engineer Stephen Ressler last year, the professor’s newest online course on the Wondrium site was still a work in progress. Now available, Epic Engineering Failures—and the Lessons They Teach has several episodes with important lessons for the environmental profession in particular. These include examinations of not just the structural failures but the human and institutional failures that led to the Chernobyl meltdown in 1986, the inundation of New Orleans in 2005, and the BP oil rig blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.

I would add to those episodes two segments on railroad bridge collapses in Great Britain during some of the formative years of the industrial revolution, one over the River Dee in western England in 1847, the other over the wide Firth of Tay in eastern Scotland in 1879. Both bridges were record-breaking crossings at the time, and both disasters implicated problems with cast iron as a structural material. The events set off public clamors plus investigations and trials that led to a winding down of the metal’s use in bridge construction, as engineers shifted to newly commercialized materials that were better at responding to loads—and less troublesome in use.

The lessons these two Victorian-era disasters teach include the nascence of features in the regulation of private business that we take for granted today. Among the responses to problems in the early growth of the British railroad industry was the deep involvement of Parliament. It passed a series of rule-setting statutes during the period of expansion. In addition, major infrastructure projects required its approval. Parliament also created specialized governmental agencies to conduct industry permitting and inspections. Agency decisionmakers in turn sought input from the legal, scientific, and engineering professions. Planners took comments from stakeholders. And of special note was the role of courts in fact-finding and determining fault when a structural collapse caused damage, injury, or death.

“The earliest regulations governing the adjudication of structural failures,” according to Matthys Levy and Mario Salvadori in Why Buildings Fall Down, "are known as the Code of Hammurabi.” That is no surprise and neither are the penalties. Their book quotes from the ancient text: “If a builder build a house for a man and do not make its construction firm and the house which he has built collapse and cause the death of the owner of the house, that builder shall be put to death.”

That is not all the code has to say on the subject. It goes on to require mitigation of property harmed during construction, and damage payments “at his own expense” when a structure is deficient because the builder did “not make its construction meet the requirements.” The requirements were customs at that time and for most of the centuries since. But they became substantial by the time of Great Britain’s big railway boom and were being adopted as engineering best practices, put into building codes, or even written into laws.

Railroads were one of the key new business sectors that emerged during the industrial revolution, often simultaneously and interdependently. Thus, British coal firms began to use the newly invented steam engine, which of course ran on coal, to dewater mines. Mining businesses were simultaneously invigorated by surging demand for coke, a newly developed fuel derived from coal that burns even hotter and made possible industrial quantities of iron for the first time. And to complete the circle, steam engines were made of iron and were ultimately used to pull iron-wheeled cars on iron rails that carried coal to commercial and household customers—and of course also eventually hauled freight and passengers.

The first intercity railroad, connecting Liverpool and Manchester, opened in 1830. What followed has been termed “Railway Mania.” Within a decade and a half, almost every town in Britain was served by at least one line. Addressing issues created by the industry, Parliament passed the first law regulating these new carriers, the Railway Act of 1840, which placed the national Board of Trade—the equivalent of our Department of Commerce—in the decisionmaking process for rail projects, and created Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate and a position known as the Commissioner of Wrecks—the last of which Ressler tags as the forerunner to the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board.

More government action followed. “Modern industrial regulation can be traced to the Railway Regulation Act 1844 in the United Kingdom, and succeeding acts,” according to Wikipedia. This new law set passenger fares to make them affordable, ensured that there would be seats for the lower classes on some trains so they could get to their places of employment—this of course purposely pleased business interests—and established a service standard of at least 12 miles per hour.

The most important legislation may have been the Railway Regulation Act of 1846, which created a national standard for gauge—the distance between the inner edges of the two rails. Without that critical involvement of government in industrial development, an efficient, coherent, and fully national system would likely never have emerged, given competitive interests. But lines instead spread from numerous urban centers around the isle and eventually knit together into the comprehensive network that still moves goods and passengers today.

On May 24, 1847, a passenger train from Chester, England, bound for Wales crossed the River Dee on a relatively new bridge supported on cast iron at a span length never tried before. It would be a fateful day. Under the 1840 legislation the Board of Trade was tasked with evaluating bridge plans. The Chester and Hollyhead Railway had proposed a typical masonry bridge with five arched spans across the 250-foot-wide Dee—a bridge that could have been built by Roman engineers—but navigation interests objected and forced the railroad to come up with an alternative. The rail company itself was concerned that a masonry bridge would be incompatible with the river bottom at that location, where the soil of the stream bed might not support the weight of all that brick and concrete.

In effect, stakeholders objected to sharing the public channel with the new private infrastructure project, and an environmental assessment militated against the masonry bridge.

At that juncture, the railroad turned to Robert Stephenson, who along with his father, George, had a sterling reputation for designing some of the first practical steam locomotives and, importantly, the railroad bridges that made motorized transport around an island nation practical. A more trusted engineer did not exist in Victorian Great Britain.

The younger Stephenson came up with a bridge design to span the Dee that satisfied the shippers and would be able to work within the environmental constraints. His plan called for only two intermediate piers, supporting metal girders—long beams designed to carry loads. These were light enough not to cause problems with the stream bed geology, and unlike arches they provided vertical clearance for the full width of the channel, pleasing the maritime interests.

The girders had to span 98 feet between abutments on the shore and the two intermediate piers, a like distance between the piers. Stephenson decided to make the girders of cast iron, since in the 1840s wrought iron—which is stronger—would be impractical and expensive at the required size, and industrial steel—even stronger—was still decades away. Even so, no mill could make cast-iron beams long enough to span the distance. Stephenson ingeniously spliced together three cast girders end to end, long enough to reach across the gaps.

Mathematical tools to design structures were in their infancy at the time, as was the science of materials. But engineers did know from empirical testing that cast iron has an important limitation. When a girder or any beam is subject to a load, it bends. If a loaded girder is supported at each end, it sags in the middle. In the process, the top is subject to compression and shortens, and the bottom is subject to tension and elongates. Stephenson decided to use girders with a cross-section like the letter I—what today we call an I-beam. It is both more efficient in resource use and stronger than a rectangular cross-section. Much of the metal is concentrated in the top flange and bottom flange—the horizontal serifs of the I. The flanges are connected by the vertical stroke of the letter, thin material called the web. The flanges do most of the work to support the load by resisting internally the compressive and tensile forces created when such a beam bends. But cast iron’s limitation is that it is only a fifth as strong in tension as in compression. So Stephenson compensated by making the bottom flange, where the tension occurs, with five times more metal than in the top.

Alarmed by the fact that shorter bridges were already beginning to fail due to fracturing of their cast-iron girders, Stephenson decided on a measure that Ressler says today would be called “belt and suspenders engineering.” Or as Why Buildings Fall Down states, “In practice, all structural failures can be considered due to a lack of redundancy.” What Stephenson did was to use a wrought-iron chain to strengthen the girder—wrought iron is much stronger in tension than cast iron. This assembly was designed to give extra resistance when the girder was subject to the load of a passing train by offsetting the resulting tension in the bottom cast-iron flange with a metal that is much less prone to brittle fracture.

The Dee bridge was in service for eight months without incident when Stephenson became concerned that its wooden deck could be subject to fire from sparks from a locomotive—a real problem in early railroads. So he had a five-inch layer of gravel poured on top of the deck. The next train was the proverbial feather—it made it almost across the last span, when one of the girders fractured, spilling the cars into the river 40 feet below. Five of the 25 aboard died, and 17 were injured.

“At the time the incident set off a national furor,” according to “Iron, Engineering, and Architectural History in Crisis,” a paper by William M. Taylor of the University of Western Australia. He relates how the accident created a crisis of confidence among the traveling public, demanding a response. “Newspapers established an imaginative topography of risk that brought order to eyewitness accounts of the disaster. Reportage rendered the event sensational and made it subject to interpretation according to multiple and overlapping causal schema and probabilities. Questions about the performance and reliability of new or competing technologies and the competence of their proponents come to the fore.”

At this tense juncture, the Railway Inspectorate created by the 1840 legislation sprang into action. Captain Simmons of the Royal Engineers was named chief investigator. After extensive research, he concluded that repeated flexing of the stiff cast-iron girder had robbed it of strength—a phenomenon we now know as metal fatigue. But there was more to the story. As Professor Ressler demonstrates in his lecture on the Dee disaster, the wrought-iron chain was attached to the girder in a location that made the chain go slack when loads were applied, thus utterly failing to work as intended. It was a critical error in engineering judgment.

Another analysis of the disaster came from what was called a coroner’s inquest but was in fact a trial. The jury declined to find fault or assess liability, deciding it was an accident with many contributing factors. Stephenson was relieved; while a charge of manslaughter had been considered, the jury declined to endorse it. It did, however, find that cast iron is “a brittle and treacherous metal.”

Finally, a royal commission was appointed to investigate. The commission too condemned the design, and called on Her Majesty’s government to establish an inquiry into iron bridges and to require substantially higher safety factors in their design. Reforms followed, led mostly by the engineering profession, which developed new ways of supporting loads across long spans. Additionally, “many existing cast-iron bridges had to be strengthened,” observes Bjorn Akesson in Understanding Bridge Collapses.

In the end, according to Ressler, “Engineering is a fundamentally human enterprise, and engineers learn from failure.” The River Dee bridge was rebuilt out of wrought iron.

Three decades later, the North British Railway was interested in increasing the economic potential of its line running from Edinburgh, Scotland, to Dundee. Unfortunately, en route the rails had to cross two broad estuaries—called firths in the local language—requiring ferries to carry the trains across. A brilliant young NBR engineer named Thomas Bouch developed what Professor Ressler terms the first roll-on-roll-off ferry system.

Bouch then began to promote bridges to replace the two ferries, which were slow and also had problems in bad weather. The Firth of Forth design he came up with envisioned two majestic suspension bridges in sequence, each with what would be the longest span in the world at that time. But first he had to tackle the two-mile-wide Firth of Tay, where an 1870 act of Parliament already authorized a bridge.

Here the river was shallower, so spans would be more in line with his previous work on railroad bridges and viaducts using masonry piers supporting what is called a truss. A truss is in general an assembly of interlocking triangles joined at their vertices. It is rigid when its members are made of wood or metal because triangles retain their shape when stressed. If you want a mental image, think of the Eiffel Tower, a triumph of the wrought-iron truss. Houses and larger buildings have been using roof trusses for millennia—they show up in Roman structures—and they became popular for civil engineering works during the industrial revolution and continue so today. Trusses take relatively little material to achieve extraordinary strength, making them efficient in engineering parlance but also in financiers’ cost-benefit analyses.

A truss can be designed to function as a girder. Instead of two flanges joined by a web, as in an I-beam, a truss can be made with two strong parallel chords joined by thin diagonal members to form the required triangles. Such a truss functions under load in much the same way as an I-beam girder, but the truss uses far less material and can extend over greater distances.

Bouch’s plan for the Firth of Tay Bridge was to use such girder trusses to span a series of brick and concrete pillars built on the river bed. It was an ambitious project, requiring 86 trusses for the spans, with the longest segments, over the navigation channel, 250 feet in length—well more than twice the span of the River Dee bridge segments.

The masonry towers were to be built on bedrock below the river bed. But after 14 towers had been successfully sited, excavators could not find bedrock below the layers of clay and silt on the river bottom at the location of the 15th tower. It was a fateful development—and a sign that NBR had failed to do what we would today call an environmental assessment. Bouch was forced to improvise a less-heavy design that could be adequately supported by the existing geology. He decided to use masonry only up to the waterline. Above that would be a light tower built of iron members joined into a vertical truss.

In making a tower that functions as a truss, engineers need vertical equivalents to the chords of a girder truss. Bouch chose cast-iron pipes for this critical function. These vertical members were designed to bear the weight of the overhead structure and passing trains only in compression, making cast iron seem a reasonable decision.

To build the towers, he used a series of stackable modules that each had six such cast-iron pipes, arrayed at the vertices of an elongated hexagon. (Such a module is visible at the right side of the illustration on this page.) Joining these verticals were horizontal wrought-iron members and wrought-iron diagonals, all fastened with bolts, creating the necessary triangles. These wrought-iron members would in principle give the cast-iron columns the needed stiffness against bending.

The modules, each 11 feet high, were placed on top of each other and bolted together, with as many as necessary added to get the required height over the water. Once again, navigation interests, from the port of Perth in this case, had led the Board of Trade to require a formidable clearance, 88 feet above the water for the width of the shipping channel. To do this, Bouch had to add two extra modules to a series of 12 towers covering a total span over the channel of over half a mile.

It was an ambitious scheme. Instead of the rails passing on the top chord of the truss, as in the rest of the structure, to get the needed clearance over the navigation channel these trusses—known as the high girder—were jacked up such that trains would actually have to go through the truss, riding on the bottom chord. According to H.J. Hopkins, writing in A Span of Bridges: An Illustrated History, “From the river bed to the top of these girders was 170 feet.” According to Akesson’s detailed drawings in Understanding Bridge Collapses, the metal pillars holding up the high girder were only 21 feet wide. These tall and slender towers had to not only support the gravity loads but had to respond to lateral stresses as well from the speeding trains and from wind. That’s where the diagonal bracing was supposed to come into play and stiffen the pillars.

The bridge’s vertical trusses would function as planned if there were no flaws in their implementation—fabrication, construction, and maintenance—but there were. Cast iron is notoriously tricky to make and flaws are inevitable. The diagonal and horizontal wrought-iron braces were attached with bolts passing through attachment points that were cast into the vertical column members upon manufacturing. These lugs had to be made with the needed bolt hole. That required the molten metal to flow in the mold around a removable spike representing the bolt.

But cold-shuts where the metal doesn’t fully join around the bolt hole were common, ensuring a weak point. Further, the removable spikes were tapered to make them easy to withdraw. As Ressler demonstrates with a model, this means that all the force applied to the lug when in service—possibly tons—would be borne by just a tiny portion of that cast-iron attachment point, overstressing the connection.

In addition, the diagonals needed to be kept taut so they could do the work in tension, which was accomplished with wedges held in place by friction. But these required constant maintenance and in practice loosened and thus deprived the cast-iron verticals of the sideways support intended. It was later revealed that painters on the bridge observed horizontal deflections of up to four inches when trains passed overhead. In “Forensic Engineering: A Reappraisal of the Tay Bridge Disaster,” Peter R. Lewis and Ken Reynolds note that the workers could feel deflections when the trains were still far off, and they soon learned to secure their paint pots. Similarly, investigators determined that some passengers had complained about swaying when crossing the bridge.

It was the same engineering fault as in the Dee collapse: a result of improper fastening of wrought-iron tension members that were meant to reinforce cast-iron members against tension from bending. But the new inadequacy sprang not from the joints’ locations, as in the Dee crossing, but from their limited strength when repeatedly stressed.

However, those problems only became evident when the bridge failed catastrophically. Until then the Tay was a celebrated construction. The bridge was completed in 1878 and it passed the Board of Trade’s inspection and was put in service. It was at the time the longest bridge in the world and thus an engineering triumph for Bouch and for Britain. Indeed, when Queen Victoria crossed the Tay shortly after the bridge opened, coming back to Windsor from her summer castle in Scotland, she was so thrilled that a few days later she knighted Bouch.

But Sir Thomas’s moment in the sun was short-lived. On the night of December 28, 1879, there was a gale-force wind coming down the Firth of Tay—by some estimates perhaps 80 miles an hour. Just after 7 p.m., a northbound passenger train en route to Dundee crossed the bridge. Eyewitnesses saw sparks flying from the flanges on the wheels as they bit into the rails under the pressure of the wind. Then nothing—the train had simply disappeared. The whole 3,000-foot-long high-girder structure—including all 12 of the truss towers supporting it—had simply broken off the masonry piers and fallen over sideways, taking the train and its passengers with it. Some 75 souls died in the fall or from drowning. There were no survivors.

Pursuant to Section Seven of yet another piece of legislation, the Railway Regulation Act of 1871, the Board of Trade appointed a court of inquiry, a body with judicial powers. In Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America, Henry Petroski describes how the court “discovered major flaws in the design and construction. It was found, for example, that Bouch had grossly underestimated the effects of strong winds that could develop along the firth. Upon being questioned about this during the inquiry, he gave no sign of having reconsidered the issue.” Ressler, however, relates that Sir Thomas had sought counsel on the subject from a most authoritative source, the Astronomer Royal, but misapplied the advice he had received. In fact, Ressler says, wind was surely the proximate cause of the disaster, but other factors had weakened the structure and contributed to the collapse.

There were three members of the court: “William Henry Barlow, president of the Institution of Civil Engineers; Colonel William Yolland, chief inspector of railways; and Henry Cadogan Rothery, wreck commissioner,” writes Petroski. “Only the first two were engineers, and professional loyalties appear to have surfaced when the time came to draft the final report.”

The three men did agree on the central conclusion: “We find that the bridge was badly designed, badly constructed, and badly maintained and that its downfall was due to inherent defects in the structure which must sooner or later have brought it down.” However, the engineers were reluctant to assign the blame to Bouch, because in their view there were too many unknown factors about what caused the collapse. They also felt they lacked the legal authority to determine fault, even though previous Section Seven inquiries had done so.

But Rothery, a lawyer, submitted a minority report. He placed the blame squarely on the engineer for a faulty design, sloppy construction, and inadequate inspection and maintenance, all of which fell under Sir Thomas’s responsibility.

The inquiry did make some unanimous findings concerning the causes of the collapse. It concluded that “the fall of the bridge was occasioned by the insufficiency of the cross bracing and its fastening to sustain the force of the gale.” Photographs it commissioned show broken-off pieces of bolt-and-lug assemblies littering the tops of the masonry piers that had supported the iron towers; numerous lugs had failed in tension, where cast iron is weakest, and many showed signs of cold-shuts. Ressler points out that fatigue no doubt played a role in the failure of the cast-iron lugs, as they were repeatedly stressed when—because of the insufficiently taut diagonals—the towers swayed with each passing train. He also notes that as the lugs failed and the towers broke off and toppled into the firth, many pillars simply pulled out of the bolts anchoring them to the masonry foundations.

As to the role of the wind in precipitating the collapse, Yolland and Barlow said, “There is no requirement issued by the Board of Trade respecting wind pressure, and there does not appear to be any understood rule in the engineering profession regarding wind pressure in railway structures; and we therefore recommend the Board of Trade should take such steps as may be necessary for the establishment of rules for that purpose.”

Rothery again dissented, insisting it was up to the engineering profession to devise safety standards for wind loading. The board compromised—it empaneled a five-person expert commission to consider the issue. The commission established standards for wind loading and safety factors to be applied to large projects.

Sir Thomas died just a few months after the inquiry’s report, a broken man. As Ressler states, “In a sense, he was the 76th victim of the Tay Bridge disaster.”

The death knell for cast iron as a structural metal came not from government or the courts, however, but from the engineers. Its time as a major construction material had passed. According to Understanding Bridge Collapses, “The lessons learned from the Tay Bridge disaster were adapted to the full in the construction and design of both the New Tay Bridge and the Forth Bridge. Maximum stability was ensured and the materials used were tested meticulously—nothing was left to chance.”

Bouch had become so disfavored that his plan for the double suspension bridge over the Forth was canceled and was replaced with a structure of immense proportions, of a radically new design, the cantilever truss. (See photo.) It crossed the deep estuary with two great leaps of 1,600 feet each, the longest spans in the world at the time. And its towers were sloped outward so that they had a squat cross-section, making them virtually invulnerable to the wind. Finally, in a thorough repudiation of past practice, it was made of steel, which had just become available in industrial quantities, and which is stronger—in both tension and compression—even than wrought iron. The Firth of Forth Bridge, now 133 years old, ended up costing ten times more than the original Tay Bridge, but for North British Rail and the riding public, it was an all-too-reasonable expense.

In replacing the Tay Bridge, however, Scotland showcased the traditionally thrifty character of its renowned engineering fraternity. Whereas the original bridge carried a single track, the new one promised to make more money by carrying two tracks on much broader wrought-iron towers, presenting a wider stance to the wind. Second, the railroad salvaged the locomotive—and waggishly renamed it The Diver—returning it to service. Finally, the company recycled the wrought members of the old bridge, reusing them in the immensely strong new structure still in service today.

Notice & Comment is the editor’s department and represents his views.

The Fall of Cast Iron and the Rise of Industrial Regulation

Fenceline Communities and Infrastructure
Author
Monica M. Esparza - Renewal of Life Trust
Renewal of Life Trust
Current Issue
Issue
5
Parent Article
headshot of Monica M. Esparza

Energy manufacturing can be hidden in plain sight, but its impacts are felt profoundly throughout communities, in rural and urban spaces. Behind walls, berms, or shrubbery, pipelines, refineries, coal stockpiles, dumps, and highways pollute the air, water, and land. While not respecting boundaries, these impacts disproportionately affect fenceline communities.

Climate and equity data visualization tools, such as the Virginia Environmental Justice Collaborative map, demonstrate that fenceline communities are increasingly being formed in rural areas as industries seek new land and methods to modernize operations. Residents and industry alike seek service upgrades in broadband and power grid reliability, roads and clean transportation options, as well as shared revenues. The passage of the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act has boosted associated benefits to enhance economic stability in rural and urban areas. But with infrastructure expansion, fenceline communities can be placed at risk.

In a globalized economy, companies are less physically bound to previous constraints of doing business. For example, a Virginia-based company can buy power from a wind energy development in Texas to offset emissions from electricity demand. This is known as a virtual power purchase agreement. As a result of this flexibility, infrastructure build-out, trade-offs, and accountability among community, government, and business stakeholders have become more nuanced.

Still, local and state conventions are often referenced first in land- use administration and approval. In broad conversations of economics and social direction, discussions about development struggles, energy consumption, climate change haz-ards, and environmental justice start here. While civil rights legislation of prior decades ensures a legal duty for businesses to notify communities of operational intent, development decisions are primarily guided by elected, appointed, and quasi-government interests, often driven by policy, institutional sponsors, and incentives such as advancing clean energy without much regard for environmental impacts.

A national review of environmental justice initiatives and regulations reflected in the consultancy-produced Integral State Environmental Justice Compendium indicates that developers and regulators need more assistance for equity and acknowledging land rights and green infrastructure initiatives, particularly as business geographies continue to expand. Greater community participation in land-use decisionmaking is critical to accomplishing these important objectives.

Community organizing can and should be a complement to development projects, rather than an adversity. A Virginia Environmental Justice Collaborative focus group composed of community leaders found that the availability of detailed knowledge, resources, and education can have substantially productive effects in reconciling environmental conflicts. EPA similarly found that building stronger on-the-ground partnerships with communities can improve results. This requires transparency, education, and public participation that allows citizens to substantively influence processes rather than be made to take part in infomercial meetings. The new federal law will help to foster infrastructure resilience and development innovation. Human capital in support of equity should be earnestly and more robustly folded into negotiations with businesses in development phases to address environmental, health, and climate change threats.

The current community engagement framework around infrastructure and its potential deleterious impacts on rural and urban areas is insufficient. Meaningful engagement is going beyond the preliminary step of acknowledging community rights. It is elevating mutual stakeholder interests in processes that have positive consequential impacts for decades, not transient media coverage and protest-hyped town hall meetings. It is valuing identities, the complexities of civic relationship, and authentically honoring stakeholder priorities.

There is space for innovation among stakeholders to support clean energy resources that protect rather than compromise public health, safety, and welfare.

Bridging a Rural-Urban Divide
Author
Danielle Stokes - University of Richmond
University of Richmond
Current Issue
Issue
5
city skyline across the bridge from rural farms with wind turbines

The new infrastructure law offers an opportunity to holistically address the geographic nuances of climate change policy and sustainable infrastructure. Stakeholders have a responsibility to consider place-based distinctions in promoting environmental justice

Many communities around the country have been grappling with the impacts of climate change for decades, but in recent years the onset of extreme natural disasters and weather events has catapulted climate adaptation and related environmental justice concerns to center stage. While policymakers have focused on climate mitigation and adaptation broadly, they are only beginning to discuss how different geographical areas will be impacted. For example, urban regions such as Boston have increasingly felt the effect of heat islands, or zones of elevated temperature resulting from buildings and roads that absorb the sun’s heat more than natural landscapes. In a 2021 study, Climate Central ranked Boston as the sixth hottest city of 159 analyzed. Upon noting the temperature differentials between urban and suburban areas, Boston-area leaders began to explore green-space designations as necessary infrastructure to mitigate the climate-related health and safety concerns that have resulted from metropolitan development. This is but one example of the climate challenges that occur along the rural-urban divide.

The nuances of the rural-urban divide warrant significant airtime within environmental policy discourse because each geographic location experiences climate change differently and may employ mitigation techniques that have implications in neighboring locations. Namely, cities can take mitigation measures such as investing in public transit, reducing access to parking, and requiring green buildings, but often cannot fully realize their mitigation goals and renewable energy needs without the building of energy infrastructure in the vast landscapes of nearby rural land. Conversely, conservation efforts and resistance to green infrastructure in rural areas provides for a more livable natural environment, but significantly shifts the costs of green development to urban areas.

As the environmental divide between these areas continues to widen, communities must make a shift toward collective action to achieve environmental protection. Accordingly, the government and other stakeholders have a responsibility to consider place-based nuances as they seek to promote environmental justice and sustainable infrastructure. The 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act offers one policy mechanism that can begin to close this gap. At its core, this legislation provides for investment in economic, transportation, and technological infrastructure—critical to the future of environmental law and its policies—that will bridge the rural-urban divide.

Understanding the varying policy distinctions between rural and urban areas requires taking a deeper dive into the many fault lines along which this divide occurs. The first step is defining urban and rural areas. The U.S. Census Bureau divides urban into two categories: urbanized areas, which have a population of 50,000 or more, and urban clusters, which have a population of at least 2,500 but less than 50,000. Rural areas are defined as the converse, or “any population, housing, or territory not in an urban area.” By this definition, only about 1 in 5 Americans live in rural areas.

The rural-urban divide goes far beyond environmental challenges—implicating cultural, educational, and political factors, which are also relevant to policymaking. Where political viewpoints are concerned, there has been a longstanding debate related to the rural-urban divide. Most recently, news outlets dissected the 2020 election results by noting that rural and small-town voters overwhelmingly supported Republicans, while those in cities and suburbs favored Democrats. While this is often the political breakdown, voting trends indicated that the rural-urban division was even more prominent within the same state as compared to 2016. Political commentators pointed to coronavirus vaccination rates and opposition to redistricting as key issues creating this divide.

Outside of the political sphere, there are also certain distinctions regarding economic development, educational attainment, and sustainability that have also been linked to rural and urban locations. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reports that the share of adults with at least a bachelor’s degree continues to increase more rapidly within urban areas, noting a 14-point gap in the percentage share of the population with a bachelor’s degree between rural and urban locations. Additionally, rural areas account for the vast majority of communities deemed “low educational attainment,” or areas where 20 percent or more of the working-age population lacks a high school diploma. When it comes to access to broadband, the Federal Communications Commission reports that although nationwide connectivity has increased in recent years, 17 percent of Americans in rural areas lack broadband access compared to less than 2 percent in urban areas.

It is clear that the rural-urban divide impacts distinct but related issues. Many argue that analyzing such issues through a lens of polarity perpetuates a divisive cycle. The National League of Cities asserts the need to shift toward a shared future of sustainable growth that “hinges less on a place’s designation as urban or rural, and more on its economic connections.” While it may be true that discussing certain aspects of politics, economic growth, or culture in terms of rural versus urban is counterproductive, where there are unique geographic considerations—such as the case with the energy transition and climate change adaptation—these distinctions can be critical to policy development.

For example, certain place-specific trade-offs should be considered from a natural-environment versus built-environment perspective. Hanna Love and Tracy Haden Loh of the Brookings Institution highlight the invaluable natural resources that rural areas provide to the world, such as “food production, carbon sequestration, and stewardship of biodiversity and habitat resources.” Yet, these are the same areas that lag in business growth and a consistent rise in standard of living, primarily because of the digital divide. On the other hand, urban areas have the benefit of increased education rates and economic gains but must also manage the costs of industrialization and denser development. Urban areas account for more than 70 percent of greenhouse gas emissions by virtue of accommodating much of the built environment.

In rural and urban areas alike, heat islands and air pollution pose significant risks to health and safety, but the methods by which these challenges are addressed vary depending upon location. For instance, rural communities generally bear the burden of renewable energy project siting, which can span thousands of acres and may or may not provide electricity within the community. Yet, rural areas benefit from access to green spaces and tree coverage. Meanwhile, urban areas have the benefit of walkability and low- or no-carbon mass transportation, but must also cope with high levels of GHG emissions and outdated energy infrastructure. To facilitate an equitable clean energy transition, place-based policy nuances must be considered at the outset so that the costs of climate adaptation and mitigation are distributed fairly.

Climate change policymaking within these defined geographic areas requires a comprehensive analysis that incorporates sociopolitical, geographic, and environmental justice frameworks. Policymakers should define rural and urban areas and their distinctions, assess standard development practices, and reconceptualize environmentalism as a collective good.

The breadth of the rural-urban divide means legislators are tasked with the seemingly insurmountable task of creating dynamic policies with multifaceted implementation techniques.

One monumental opportunity to rise to this challenge is presented by the Infrastructure Act. The legislation seeks to reduce climate change impacts of transportation systems, increase broadband connectivity, and enhance electric grid reliability. Most importantly, it provides for rebuilding America’s roads, bridges, and rails, which is expected to ease inflationary pressure and strengthen supply chains. The Infrastructure Act has also allocated significant funding to addressing many environmental justice concerns related to public participation and local development. However, the act did not go nearly as far as many would have liked in addressing how the climate crisis will be handled differently by urban dwellers and rural populations.

OF the aspects of the rural-urban divide alluded to within the Infrastructure Act, one of the most important is access—to both transportation and information. The act calls for a $100 billion investment in railroads and other forms of public transit, as well as a $65 billion expansion in broadband access. Implementation will be supported by the Department of Energy’s newly established Clean Energy Corps, which seeks to establish a workforce that will bring innovative solutions to the climate crisis. As for transportation, the Infrastructure Act seeks to reduce the climate change impacts of the system as well as increase the use of electric vehicles, making transportation access more sustainable and reliable, especially for urban dwellers. In broadband access, the new funds will help to achieve key procedural environmental justice goals, particularly those related to equal access to and meaningful involvement in decisionmaking.

By connecting economic investment, technological advancement, and sustainable transportation, the Infrastructure Act could enhance access to climate solutions and environmental justice resources. To do so would require guidance that explicitly details how varied communities—wealthy, underprivileged, BIPOC, rural, urban—experience climate change, and defines necessary mitigation and adaptation measures that account for place-based nuances. For example, the Infrastructure Act’s investment in power, grid reliability, and resilience is simply that—an investment. The actual process by which policy is implemented will require federal, state, local, and individual input.

Bridging the rural-urban divide thus requires a base level of procedural knowledge, community engagement, and consensus building. In green-energy development, for example, one of the first steps is equipping community members to participate in public meetings. Green development seeks to foster economic growth and sustainability while considering social and environmental impacts. In most communities in the United States (rural and urban alike), public meetings are a prerequisite to new development approval. The approval process typically begins with the local planning commission, which conducts the preliminary project review. Provided that all stipulations are satisfied and there is not significant public disapproval, the project then moves on to the next governing body, most often the city council or county commission.

Under the current system, land-use planners and community members often operate with limited resources that would benefit from investments under the Infrastructure Act. Local legislators set forth the parameters for new development, but public opinion can make or break a project. Support of and opposition to green development is not a place-specific sentiment; however, incentives and challenges vary along geographic lines. Challenges most often take the form of NIMBY, or “Not in My Back Yard,” complaints. These can be raised for a variety of reasons—both reasonable and otherwise—and take different forms depending on the location. A few geographically distinct examples related to the clean energy transition and environmental justice come to mind.

Consider utility-scale renewable energy projects. The Princeton University’s Net Zero America report estimates that 228,000 square miles—an area larger than Wyoming and Colorado combined—of renewable energy development is necessary to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. In rural areas, utility-scale renewable energy projects are often pitched as economic development opportunities that will revitalize a community. RMI, a clean energy non-profit, projects that 600 gigawatts of new wind and solar will emerge in rural areas between 2020 and 2030. The group suggests that these projects will be valued at approximately $11 billion by 2030. The bulk of financial benefits would take the form of tax revenues collected by local governments and annual wages from construction, operation, and maintenance jobs.

Yet another economic benefit could be the incentive pay that landowners receive for transitioning underutilized land to renewable energy sites. Land-lease payments to rural property owners hosting wind turbines or solar panels on their properties are estimated to generate $2.2 billion annually by 2030. For many landowners, the possibility of passively earning income during the life of a renewable project, which is often 20-30 years, is particularly promising where the property would not be profitable otherwise. This constituency sees renewable energy development as a sound economic investment that happens to also provide environmental benefits. As a result, these stakeholders may often serve as community support advocates for green development.

On the other hand, green development proposals give rise to NIMBY complaints that range from reasonable environmental concerns to a desire to maintain the status quo both aesthetically and economically. Those who raise concerns most often do so in the name of environmental conservation and wildlife habitat preservation, which are certainly legitimate considerations. There are, however, certain nuisance claims that are linked, whether accurately or inaccurately, to potential health effects. Specifically, landowners have pointed to solar panel glare, wind turbine shadow flicker, and noise pollution as causing feelings of stress, disrupting sleep, and triggering seizures. Studies by health departments in Vermont, Maine, and Oregon have acknowledged that health effects of green development are mostly minimal, especially compared to the harmful effects of air pollution, which the transition to renewable energy helps to mitigate.

In urban areas, the same planning and approval processes for sustainable infrastructure must take place—and present similar challenges. In coastal cities, for example, the public debate often centers on retrofitted infrastructure such as seawalls. Seawalls are necessary to prevent erosion and protect against storm surges, but they also disrupt the natural flow of sand and sediment, to the harm of other ecosystems. In urban areas more broadly, green development often raises concerns about disrupting neighborhood demographics as a result of creating large green spaces and installing small-scale renewable energy. Those in support of such projects point to preservation of private property, increased property value, and greater tax revenues as advantages. Those in opposition underscore the trade-offs between protecting the built versus natural environment.

As we grapple with the consequences of climate change, all communities—rural and urban—will play key roles in the clean energy transition. From a renewable energy perspective, rural and urban areas must each contribute to reducing GHGs by shifting reliance on fossil fuels and providing for economic revitalization. To satisfy decarbonization goals, the power sector will need to incorporate utility-scale and distributed energy. The distinction between these energy sources is their proximity to end-users. Utility-scale systems are located farther away from end-users and are connected via transmission lines (often found in rural areas), whereas distributed systems are located at or near the location where it will be used (the primary option in urban areas).

While utility-scale and distributed renewable energy sources provide environmental benefits, they also have some negative environmental impacts. These include aesthetic challenges, land disturbance, and project decommissioning. One of the key distinctions between utility-scale and distributed sources is the energy footprint, or spatial area that they cover. In rural areas, projects can span hundreds or thousands of acres, with facilities as tall as 300 feet. In urban areas rooftop solar panels and small wind turbines have a much smaller footprint, but they often clash with standard residential and commercial facades.

To understand the rural-urban divide beyond the context of NIMBY complaints and the project footprint, take the Blue Creek Wind Farm project as an example. This Ohio facility spans 40,000 acres in Paulding and Van Wert counties, both of which are deemed rural by Census Bureau standards. The project generates 304 megawatts of electricity, enough to power approximately 76,000 homes. The local communities benefit from the $2.7 million annual tax revenues and $2 million in land lease payments, which were negotiated as part of the project approval process. The project provides electricity not only for local rural communities, but for a distant urban area as well.

Ohio State University entered into an agreement with the project developer to purchase 50 MW of wind energy capacity, providing approximately 25 percent of the Columbus campus’s energy needs. This arrangement provides insight into the shared costs and benefits of green development across geographic areas. In Van Wert and Paulding counties, citizens receive economic benefits and a portion of clean energy gains at the expense of disrupted sight lines. Yet, citizens in Columbus reap environmental benefits at only an economic cost. Such trade-offs are the equities that must be balanced as we move towards a clean energy future.

These examples indicate how critical the Infrastructure Act funding—and its provision of access—is to furthering green policy initiatives and bridging the rural-urban divide. The current process for land-use development relies heavily on public input. In rural and urban areas alike, there are community members in support of and in opposition to certain aspects of development. Their level of engagement with the development process significantly depends on access. This means access to broadband, which is especially relevant in rural areas, in order to review project plans, provide comments, attend virtual meetings, and understand the intricacies of green development. It also means access to public transit and other sustainable modes of transportation in order to attend public meetings, which is crucial in urban areas. Beyond the scope of the Infrastructure Act, community members also need access to information and social capital to be engaged public participants.

Meaningful participation in and access to the legislative and development process has been a foundational tenet of the environmental justice movement. From the federal government’s perspective, environmental justice takes a person-centered view, requiring equitable policies no matter one’s race, color, national origin, or income. The nature of the climate crisis necessitates an expansion of the environmental justice framework to also incorporate a place-centered view to equitably address geographic differences.

Because almost all communities can be ignorant or ambivalent about the climate crisis, stakeholders in both the public and private sectors have a responsibility to provide impartial resources for community members to make informed decisions. The International Institute for Environment and Development argues that “adaptation is all about the quality of local knowledge and of local capacity and willingness to act.” Environmental justice is primarily concerned with meaningful involvement of diverse communities. To be an informed participant in the development process at minimum requires a basic understanding that present action or inaction can lead to future risks. Misguided and under-appreciated NIMBY complaints serve as prime examples of the need for community education about green development and policy trade-offs. Community members should be equipped to not only express their policy preferences, but to also inquire as to the potential outcomes where alternative preferences are concerned.

This consideration of alternative preferences is a key component to reframing perspectives on climate change policies. Traditionally, individualism has been the driving force in most policy debates. Yet, the nature of climate change demands collective action and consideration of how one community’s actions or inactions affects another. In a 2021 tweet, Pope Francis shared that “climate change can be faced with a renewed sense of shared responsibility for our world, and an effective solidarity based on justice, a sense of our common destiny, and recognition of the unity of our human family.” Although the individualism versus collectivism debate often plays out on a global scale, it is also relevant when considering energy and environmental justice along rural and urban lines. This disconnect is a major challenge to consensus building and perpetuates a cycle of one area bearing costs at the expense of another.

Environmentalism and the energy transition requires investments and sacrifices in all geographies, with the understanding that green development yields a collective good. For example, urban areas cannot sustain utility-scale projects given the necessary footprint, but they can prioritize distributed renewable energy. To facilitate equitable outcomes, policymakers should consider all costs and benefits, locally and across geographic scales, and recognize that these costs and benefits can differ depending on whether the area is rural or urban.

The time is now to equitably balance the interests of all communities so that climate adaptation costs and benefits are evenly distributed across geographies. Doing so requires policymaking that engages in holistic risk assessments and explicitly acknowledges the need for collectivism and global citizenship in the environmental framework. The Infrastructure Act is a significant first step in balancing equity from a procedural justice perspective, as it provides rural and urban communities with tools to access the development process. Yet there is still significant room for legislation to prioritize geographic and social equity. To effectively bridge the rural-urban divide, we must analyze policy choices through an environmental justice lens that considers the intricacies of various geographic areas while respecting and requiring the input of all stakeholders. TEF

LEAD FEATURE The new infrastructure law offers an opportunity to holistically address the geographic nuances of climate change policy and sustainable infrastructure. Stakeholders have a responsibility to consider place-based distinctions in promoting environmental justice.

Providing Tools for Equitable Brownfield Revitalization
Author
Selah Goodson Bell - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
3
Selah Goodson Bell

Blight, job loss, and environmental contamination are pervasive in post-industrial hubs like the Menomonee River Valley in Milwaukee or the Lower Frankford Creek Watershed in Philadelphia. Many of these areas are also inundated with brownfields, defined by the federal government as “abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination.” Brownfield remediation and revitalization are complicated processes that require a solid understanding of environmental contamination, mapping, stakeholder management, end-use planning, and finance. ELI’s latest landmark environmental justice publication, the Brownfield Revitalization in Green Healthy Towns (BRIGHT) Guide, unpacks each of these topics and provides local communities with tools and resources to organize and lead the process of revitalization for themselves.

The guide empowers just, equitable, and self-defined sustainable development. Chapters in the guide walk readers through the process of creating and implementing a corridor project to produce positive health, ecological, and economic outcomes in overburdened communities. Critically, the guide is a living document that will improve content as new information and best practices emerge. ELI encourages all readers to send more information on corridor planning that staff can integrate into the text.

Last summer, EPA’s Brownfields Program updated its analysis of the population living within 0.5 and 3 miles of brownfields sites that received EPA funding. While about 44 percent of the U.S. population lives within 3 miles of a site, nearby communities were described as “more minority, low income, linguistically isolated, and less likely to have a high school education than the U.S. population as a whole.” This analysis complements a well-documented body of literature that highlights the correlation of race and class with exposures to environmental hazards.

Brownfields are significant pieces of a larger story of environmental racism, wherein marginalized people and communities face a plethora of compounding oppressive forces that directly damage their economic and physical wellbeing and harm their relationship with the land and environment. Specifically, many past government policies and practices, like redlining and the use of restrictive covenants, produced racially segregated cities and thus allowed investments into public infrastructure, economic development, and environmental protection to be concentrated in predominantly wealthy, white areas, often leaving the communities of color to live amongst industrial toxicity. One such community is the southwest area of Fresno, California, which hosts approximately 65 of the city of Fresno’s 130 brownfield parcels, demonstrating one of the many consequences of environmental racism.

While targeted economic development in environmentally overburdened areas has promise, historically, such efforts have displaced long-time residents in a process called green gentrification. The remediation of brownfields and growth of more sustainable end uses often results in increased property taxes, housing prices, and retail prices in the area. Without intentional policies and practices to account for this, economically disadvantaged community members are often replaced by people who can afford the higher cost of living.

Brownfield revitalization can perpetuate environmental racism if anti-gentrification measures are not implemented in conjunction with development. Anti-gentrification strategies vary depending on the needs of a community, the status of the target area’s housing market, and the presence of prohibitive city or state laws, among other factors.

In corridor projects, community members occupy key decisionmaking roles, allowing them to address the interconnected needs of their neighborhoods. Within the context of brownfields and blight, the corridor project model allows the remediation of a variety of parcels that are often too small to attract redevelopment on their own. The model incorporates end uses that can improve a community’s public health, climate resiliency, and economic prosperity.

Between 2010 and 2017, EPA financed about 83 corridor projects through its Area Wide Planning Grant program. Initiated in 2010, the program offered funding and technical assistance to communities surrounded by brownfields. But the Trump administration gutted the program’s funding after 2017, pursuing alternative means of brownfield remediation that lacked an explicit focus on community engagement. Fortunately, the Biden administration has expressed a desire to rectify this, as demonstrated by the $1.5 billion set aside in the bipartisan infrastructure law to “scale up community-led brownfields revitalization.”

While this is encouraging, the BRIGHT Guide recognizes that federal funding fluctuates as administrations vary in their commitments to sustainable development and environmental justice. In the potential absence of a federal funding model, communities can turn to the BRIGHT Guide to find lessons learned through previous corridor projects and area-wide plans to guide redevelopment in their own neighborhoods.

Providing Tools for Equitable Brownfield Revitalization

Fix America's Forests
Author
Jonathan Wood - Property and Environment Research Center
Property and Environment Research Center
Current Issue
Issue
2
White house surrounded by smoke

As the Caldor Fire made its menacing march toward South Lake Tahoe last summer, it burned through more than two hundred thousand acres and destroyed more than seven hundred homes. While the effects of the fire were tragic, a greater disaster was fortunately averted when firefighters steered the fire away from the city and to an area where fuel loads had been reduced through active forest management. This tamed the fire enough to get it under control.

South Lake Tahoe was not the only area where recent management actions helped stave off disaster in 2021. The Dixie Fire, the largest single fire in California’s history, burned nearly one million acres, including 70 percent of Lassen Volcanic National Park. Thankfully, firefighters “successfully leveraged the park’s previous and current fire and fuels management projects to preserve park resources and structures,” according to a Park Service release. Without the benefit of these projects, more of the park’s infrastructure could have been lost, making its recovery from the fire more difficult.

Fire is nothing new to western forests, which are adapted to flame due to climate, terrain, and Indigenous tribes’ use of prescribed fire for millennia. However, recent catastrophic wildfires are far more destructive than historic fire regimes. They are more likely to threaten old-growth trees, wipe out habitat for wildlife, and cause erosion that degrades watersheds and fish habitat.

And due to growing populations near forests, modern fires also threaten communities and property in ways not seen before. From 2005 to 2020, wildfires destroyed nearly 100,000 structures. But 62 percent of this destruction occurred in 2017, 2018, and 2020 alone, according to a report from Headwater Economics.

As with any complex phenomenon, no single cause explains the wildfire crisis. Climate change plays a major role by extending the wildfire season and drying out fuel. But decades of mismanagement also bear a significant part of the blame. The federal government’s fire suppression efforts throughout much of the 20th century removed low-intensity fire from forests. Unrestrained by burning, brush and small-diameter trees grew to compete with old growth, making forests more vulnerable to insects and disease. Eventually, the buildup of excess fuel encouraged fires to burn hotter and to move from the ground to the canopy, where they do more damage and are more difficult to suppress.

Unlike other factors contributing to the wildfire crisis, excess fuels are a problem the Forest Service can do something about in the short term. But it isn’t—or at least not enough.

Forest restoration, the use of mechanical thinning, prescribed fire, replanting, and erosion control techniques, could reduce wildfire damage while promoting healthier forests. However, the Forest Service reports an 80-million-acre backlog in needed restoration, more than 40 percent of the 193 million acres under the agency’s control. 63 million of these acres are deemed by the agency to be at high or very high risk of burning. Add to this the 54 million acres managed by the Department of the Interior, and the total area of federal land facing high or very high fire risks is larger than the state of California.

Yet, from 2009 to 2018, the Forest Service averaged only 4 million acres of forest restoration per year. At that rate, it would take decades to address the backlog even if, miraculously, no new risks arose in the interim.

Of course, wildfires are not limited to federal forests. But they nonetheless play an outsized role, due to the concentration of federal land in the west as well as the conditions throughout many national forests. While the federal government owns less than a third of forests nationwide, it controls roughly half the forested land in Arizona and Washington, 60 percent in California, Colorado, Montana, and Oregon, and 80 percent in Idaho and Nevada. Due to this concentration and differences in how federal and private lands are managed, the total area of federal land facing high or very high wildfire risks far exceeds the 52 million private acres facing such risks. And federal lands are consistently overrepresented in the total area burned, including 75 percent of the acreage burned in the West during 2020.

Recognizing the clear shortfall in managing federal forests, Congress appropriated roughly $1.5 billion in the recent infrastructure legislation for mechanical thinning, prescribed fire, and post-fire recovery projects. But there may be a long road from appropriating money to on-the-ground restoration because the problem is not simply a lack of funds. In a recent report, “Fix America’s Forests: Reforms to Restore National Forests and Tackle the Wildfire Crisis,” the Property and Environment Research Center documents significant obstacles keeping the Forest Service from clearing the restoration backlog.

For one, the agency’s personnel have shifted dramatically away from forest management. Perhaps understandably, the Forest Service has responded to fire’s political salience by shifting resources to suppression. The programs that fell victim to the agency’s “fire borrowing,” a euphemism for raiding other programs to fund firefighting efforts, were “often those that improve the health and resilience of our forested landscapes and mitigate the potential for wildland fire in future years,” according to a 2015 Forest Service report. Consequently, the number of staff specializing in forest management has declined by half since 1992, while the firefighting staff has doubled. “It is readily apparent that the Forest Service cannot meet national direction to increase the pace and scale of forest restoration with its current workforce,” concludes a 2019 survey of Forest Service managers.

Second, forest restoration projects must navigate significant bureaucratic obstacles, including review under the National Environmental Policy Act. Depending on the extent of anticipated impacts, NEPA may require the Forest Service to analyze a project through, in order of increasing complexity and expense, a categorical exclusion, environmental assessment, or environmental impact statement. The agency may also need to develop a range of alternatives to the project and analyze their impacts. The resulting documents routinely span hundreds of pages of dense text, with appendixes spanning another thousand pages or more.

While well-intentioned, NEPA reviews can significantly increase project costs and inject substantial delays. The average delay varies by type of review, from nine months to document a project’s consistency with a categorical exclusion to nearly three years for an environmental impact statement.

Unfortunately, NEPA presents a bigger obstacle for forest restoration projects than other Forest Service projects. Forest restoration projects are roughly twice as likely to require an environmental impact statement than the agency’s overall average. Forest restoration project reviews also tend to take longer, for a given level of analysis, than other project types. An environmental assessment for a forest restoration project takes, for instance, one and half times as long to complete as an environmental assessment for a mining plan of operations.

Moreover, the kind of ambitious, large-scale forest restoration projects needed to tackle the restoration backlog are likely to result in unusually complicated reviews and long delays. The top quintile of environmental impact statements, which take an average of six years to complete, may be a better approximation of the challenge.

NEPA is premised on a type of precautionary principle: that it is better to do nothing than to do something without fully studying the environmental and other risks. Whatever the case for this approach in other circumstances, the wildfire crisis is increasingly showing that the “do nothing” option presents its own substantial risks. A delay may increase the risk that a fire will break out, threatening communities, wildlife habitat, and watersheds. Or the cost and time required to review a project may sap the agency’s ability to pursue other restoration projects.

The recent infrastructure legislation includes a small but important tweak to address NEPA’s effect on forest restoration. An amendment proposed by Senator Steven Daines, Republican of Montana, and included in the final text authorizes the secretary of agriculture to declare an emergency situation based on hazards to human health and safety or threats to natural resources. If an emergency is declared, the Forest Service need only compare its proposed response and a “no action” alternative. This may facilitate more prompt responses by avoiding the need to develop and consider a range of alternatives where the costs of delay are especially high.

In many western forests, the Endangered Species Act presents an additional complexity. If a project funded or implemented by a federal agency may jeopardize a species or adversely modify critical habitat, the agency must consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service to identify ways that impacts to the species can be avoided or mitigated.

Again, the law’s intention is good but the means of pursuing it presents under-appreciated risks. Consider the Forest Service’s ill-fated Pumice Project, which was proposed in 2011 to reduce wildfire risks on nearly 10,000 acres of Klamath National Forest. The project faced a decade of objections from local environmental organizations over alleged impacts to the northern spotted owl, a species listed as threatened under the ESA. Ultimately, 2021’s Antelope Fire “burned through the site before a single chainsaw touched a tree, destroying the owl habitat that the environmental groups were trying to save,” report the Sacramento Bee’s Ryan Sabelow and Dale Kasler. Lamenting the time and resources sunk “into kind of bulletproofing” the environmental analyses, Drew Stroberg, a district ranger in the Klamath Forest, observed that “now, they might as well be in the trash can.”

In much of the West, delays can give the ESA a cascading effect. If a new species is listed or critical habitat is designated during the period between an environmental review and project completion, the agency can be penalized for failing to anticipate and hit a moving target. Under the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 Cottonwood decision, such regulatory changes require the Forest Service to restart consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service at the forest plan level, then to restart consultation for individual projects, all before proceeding. The Obama administration urged the Supreme Court to reverse Cottonwood, explaining in a petition that the Court review the case that the ruling “has the potential to cripple the Forest Service.”

Litigation is another obstacle—one that compounds the others. Roughly two-thirds of the lawsuits challenging Forest Service projects from 2005 to 2019 targeted forest restoration projects. However, the consequences of litigation have not been evenly felt. 85 percent of cases were filed in courts within the Ninth Circuit. Nearly half were filed in only two district courts: the District of Montana and the Eastern District of California, both areas facing significant wildfire risks.

The effects of litigation are not limited to those projects that end up in court. The Forest Service is risk averse, preferring the delay and increased expense of ever-longer reviews over the negative media and political attention that comes with losing a lawsuit. Thus agency personnel respond to the perceived threat of litigation by trying to “litigation proof” NEPA and ESA reviews, which adds to the time and resources required while often failing to avoid lawsuits.

Conflict over the Bozeman Municipal Watershed Project presents a worst-case scenario of bureaucracy and litigation compounding the effects of each other. In 2004, the Forest Service determined that wildfire risks in an area of the Custer–Gallatin Forest threatened 80 percent of the city of Bozeman, Montana’s drinking water supply and required urgent action.

The Forest Service spent three years preparing a draft NEPA document. While the agency was working to finalize that document, a federal court overturned the delisting of the local grizzly bear population, triggering the agency’s duty to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service. In 2010, the Forest Service released its NEPA and ESA analysis and approved the project. Administrative challenges were filed. While those were pending, the Ninth Circuit decided several unrelated cases that caused the agency to revise its analysis again to address perceived litigation risks.

After that additional review was complete, a lawsuit was filed. While that was pending, critical habitat was designated for the Canada lynx, which led the Ninth Circuit to hold in Cottonwood that projects like Bozeman’s required an additional round of analysis, and resulted in a district court enjoining the project. After the Forest Service completed the required analysis, the district court lifted its injunction in 2020, allowing the project to finally move forward.

Such delays could perhaps be justified if they resulted in material improvements to a seriously flawed project. But that wasn’t the case with the watershed project, which remains the same as it was originally proposed more than 15 years ago. It’s questionable what, if any, benefit the public got from the protracted litigation and bureaucratic morass.

Here, too, the recent infrastructure bill contains a small but potentially significant change. Senator Daines’s amendment provides that courts can only enjoin forest restoration projects in cases where the secretary of agriculture has declared an emergency situation if the court determines that the challenge is likely to succeed. This reform eliminates, at least for this class of cases, a Ninth Circuit rule that allows a plaintiff to obtain an injunction by raising only a “serious question” on the merits of its case.

Despite reforms in the infrastructure law, most of these obstacles remain and will delay implementation, increase costs, and encourage continued conflict over forest restoration. And even were it possible for the entire $1.5 billion to go to on-the-ground forest restoration, this would be less than $20 per acre in the backlog. Thus, it will be essential that the Forest Service work with outside partners to stretch the money further. States, tribes, and private parties are motivated to help due to the significant benefits healthy forests provide, including clean air and water, wildlife habitat, and recreation opportunities.

For instance, the National Forest Foundation and Salt River Project, a water utility, have formed the Northern Arizona Forest Fund to perform restoration in five national forests. Since 2015, the fund has raised more than $6.2 million from a diverse group of supporters, including the Arizona Department of Fish and Wildlife, the cities of Scottsdale and Phoenix, Coca-Cola, businesses dependent on outdoor recreation, and conservation groups. From the perspective of these supporters, paying for forest restoration today is much better than suffering the consequences of wildfire tomorrow. Thanks to these contributions, as well as volunteer time and expertise, the Northern Arizona Forest Fund has implemented fuel reduction projects on 13,600 acres, improved 2,600 acres of wetlands, planted 90,000 trees, and reduced erosion along 170 miles of roads and trails.

In many communities, raising such sums up-front for the promise of future benefits may be difficult. However, a recent financial innovation can overcome this challenge. Two nonprofit organizations, Blue Forest and the World Resources Institute, have pioneered the concept of a forest resilience bond, which raises private capital to pay for forest restoration and allows beneficiaries to pay investors back over time as benefits are achieved.

In 2018, the groups raised $4 million from investors to implement the first forest resilience bond in the Tahoe National Forest, with the State of California and the Yuba Water Agency signing on to repay the bond. Ironically, the Forest Service could not sign on as a beneficiary, despite arguably getting the biggest benefit, because it is forbidden from committing funds for terms longer than its current appropriation. Working with experts from the National Forest Foundation, the bond has enabled restoration projects covering 7,000 acres, completing in 4 years work that the Forest Service expected to take 10 to 12.

With this proof of concept, Blue Forest is scaling up this innovation substantially. It is currently raising $25 million for a second bond, to restore more than 28,000 acres of Tahoe National Forest. And it has three more bonds in the pipeline, which could help restore tens of thousands more acres across the West.

The Forest Service believes that these private models could be replicated in other areas where healthy forests provide substantial benefits. The agency’s National Partnership Office has developed a “Conservation Finance Opportunities Map” that seeks to match forest areas in need of restoration with local interests that would benefit from this work.

The Forest Service has also experimented with using private partners to reduce bureaucratic delays. In 2013, the Colville National Forest approved the “A to Z” project, a timber harvesting contract under which the winning bidder would take on the NEPA process in addition to performing the timber harvest and restoration work. Vaagen Brothers Lumber, the sawmill that won the contract, hired a third party to perform the environmental review under the Forest Service’s supervision (to prevent any appearance of a conflict of interest). Although a lawsuit was filed, a federal court upheld the arrangement.

Other agencies hampered by slow, expensive bureaucracies have found success with this approach. The Food and Drug Administration, for instance, struggled for decades to increase the pace of new drug reviews. In 1992, it struck a deal with pharmaceutical companies to pay higher fees in exchange for faster reviews. Within five years, the median approval time dropped from 27 months to 14 months. Today, industry is a strong advocate for the reform, supporting several reauthorizations despite increases in the fee. The same could be true in the forest context.

Partnering with local governments also presents an opportunity to stretch dollars further while obtaining the benefits of local knowledge and enthusiasm. Under the Forest Service’s Good Neighbor program, states, tribes, and counties can take the lead on planning and implementing timber sales and stewardship contracts. In 2020, Good Neighbor Authority projects constituted 11 percent of all timber sales in Forest Service Region 1, which covers Montana, North Dakota, and parts of Idaho and South Dakota. The program lets states keep receipts from timber contracts to fund additional restoration projects. But tribes and counties are arbitrarily excluded from this part of the program.

If the backlog is going to be overcome, reforms to address the obstacles described above are needed to scale up these innovative public-private partnerships. Such reforms should seek to encourage collaboration, rather than conflict, to increase the Forest Service’s flexibility to partner with states, tribes, and private parties, and to facilitate market reforms that can make forest restoration cheaper, or even profitable.

Some of these reforms are politically easier than others. For instance, there’s no good reason for the Good Neighbor Authority program to relegate tribes and counties to junior partner status. They should enjoy the same benefits as states do. Likewise, giving the Forest Service greater financial flexibility to form long-term partnerships is critical since forest restoration is not a one-time event but an ongoing responsibility.

Other reforms are likely to be harder. Ultimately, the time and expense required to navigate projects through environmental reviews and the courts needs to be reduced. Such delays may be frustrating to Forest Service officials. But it is a deal breaker for private investment in forest restoration. Consider the perspective of a potential investor in a forest resilience bond. Before locking up any substantial amount of funds, she would reasonably want to know how much a project will cost, when on-the-ground restoration will occur, and when she will see a return on her investment. The risk that the money will be committed only for a lawsuit to delay implementation indefinitely may be too great for many investors to bear.

Congress is considering many bills that aim to address different parts of these problems. Senator Wyden of Oregon, for instance, has introduced the National Prescribed Fire Act, which seeks to reduce Clean Air Act barriers to prescribed fire and to establish a categorical exclusion to reduce NEPA burdens. Senators Daines and Feinstein have introduced the Root and Stem Project Authorization Act, which seeks to make it easier to replicate the “A to Z” model and to reduce litigation risks by shortening the statute of limitations for challenges to forest restoration projects. And Congressman Westerman of Arkansas, the only forester currently serving in Congress, has introduced the comprehensive Resilient Federal Forests Act, which among many other things seeks to streamline the NEPA process by expanding categorical exclusions and to legislatively reverse the Ninth Circuit’s Cottonwood decision.

Reforms like these could be the difference between tackling the forest restoration backlog or allowing the wildfire crisis to continue worsening. With fire seasons growing longer, millions of acres burning every year, and more people and homes at risk, the stakes could not be greater. TEF

CENTERPIECE A daunting restoration backlog in National Forests fuels the wildfire crisis. With increased funding coming, significant policy and litigation obstacles still stand in the way of forest restoration