Gender-Based Violence and Climate Change
Author
Achinthi C. Vithanage - Pace University
Pace University
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article
Achinithi Vithanage

Gender can define those most vulnerable to climate change. Climate migration demonstrates this vulnerability all too well. When extreme weather events occur, shelters offer little security from sexual violence. When population displacement is triggered by climate impacts, violence is not uncommon en route to and within relocated settlements. When natural disasters force family separation, a rise in sexual trafficking and gender-based labor exploitation has been observed among trapped populations. When climate-related events disrupt socialized gender roles, frustration lends to domestic violence. These are all situations in which gender-based violence, or GBV, comes to light.

According to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, GBV refers to “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or [violence] that affects women disproportionately.” The UN Human Rights Council expands that to include “any harmful act directed against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender.” Thus, GBV may be directed against men, boys, and individuals who identify with an alternate gender concept.

While the gender convention and the international human rights regime will remain central to addressing GBV and underlying factors, such as inequality and discrimination, the international climate change regime offers some avenues for incorporating GBV considerations. Having adopted over 80 decisions with gender-related mandates and seen a rise in gender-responsive language in several of the climate convention’s annual conference documents, plus the Paris Agreement, the climate change legal regime is developing a strong track record. Whether the inclusion of gender-responsive language has translated to systematic addressing of gender inequality issues, including GBV in climate change contexts, remains a work in progress. Existing monitoring and implementation frameworks, such as the Nationally Determined Contributions under Paris, offer opportunities to translate that language into action.

Recognition of the intersection between GBV and climate change is of growing interest to governments of climate vulnerable states, especially those with a long history of GBV. This coincides with the realization that climate change may not only generate new GBV issues, it may also unearth and exacerbate existing ones. In a region known for its history of GBV, Samoa and Fiji stand out for their use of NDCs to tackle GBV. Both countries included gender-responsive language in their climate goals, which subsequently led to dedicated national security policy that integrated gender and climate.

Climate finance mechanisms—like the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility —have also demonstrated a willingness to address gender inequality. While these mechanisms have not specifically included GBV, conditioning finance on the inclusion of GBV as a consideration in project implementation is relatively simple to put into practice.

Furthermore, Climate Change Gender Action Plans, known as ccGAPs, are a mechanism developed by IUCN offering countries a framework for embedding the goals of the climate convention’s Gender Action Plan in a way that aligns with country circumstances, while such work is supported by IUCN resources and expertise.

Already utilized by over 20 countries, ccGAPs have shown success in prompting the inclusion of gender considerations in NDCs. This mechanism warrants consideration for broader adoption by the international climate change regime.

Most importantly, addressing GBV in the climate change nexus necessitates elevating “invisible leaders” in this space to positions of decisionmaking power.

While it is true that climate change does not discriminate but that its impacts are often discriminatory, it is also true that addressing the gender dimensions of those impacts is both achievable and necessary.

Environmental Defense Is National Security
Author
Lynn Scarlett - Former Deputy Secretary of the Interior
Former Deputy Secretary of the Interior
Current Issue
Issue
1

Last November, I heard Sherri Goodman, appointed in 1993 as the first-ever deputy undersecretary of defense for environmental security, speak about her new book, Threat Multiplier. After the event, one of her former DOD colleagues called Goodman “whip smart” and a “doer.” These qualities undergirded her efforts to move the Pentagon’s institutional behemoth toward investing first in environmental stewardship and, eventually, in climate action.

The task was, and remains, daunting. With a budget in 2024 of nearly $900 billion, DOD employs some 1.4 million active duty personnel and 950,000 civilians who operate at over 750 installations in the United States and across the globe. Its mission: “To provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the United States.”

How Goodman helped introduce environmental stewardship and climate action into this ponderous institution presents lessons both in political craftsmanship and in creating conceptual linkages that affirm why environmental and climate action are integral to national security. Goodman’s task, as she saw it, was not primarily about saving the planet; it was about securing a nation and its people. In her view the effort was not, as some colleagues thought, mission creep.

Having come to DOD as a Clinton administration appointee from the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Goodman had deep knowledge both of military substance and political processes. She arrived at the Pentagon when most of the armed forces leadership thought of environmental investment as unrelated to security. How could she shift military awareness toward understanding that environmental stewardship is “not only good for trees and turtles” but also “good for the health and safety of our troops and the communities they served?”

Even before the effects of climate change had become apparent, Goodman had several immediate tasks in the 1990s. First, she had to ensure DOD properties transferred to other agencies and entities in the Base Realignment and Closure process were cleaned up and ready. Second, in an era of increasing focus on environmental protections and sustaining endangered species, she had to find ways to align such stewardship with the military’s security mission. Without such alignment, base commanders and DOD officials were likely to see such efforts as burdensome.

Goodman understood the importance of illustrating co-benefits—how measures to protect red-cockaded woodpecker habitat could serve as real-world landscape obstacles important to training exercises. She also understood the importance of collaboration, including with communities adjacent to properties being transferred under BRAC.

The shifting awareness of environmental investments as intrinsic to the defense mission was more than window-dressing. As Goodman recounts, cleaning up military waste is essential to the health of troops and their families. Sustaining clean water by shifting away from lead bullets helps maintain a healthy military. Eventually, in tackling climate change, Goodman and her DOD allies showed that reliance on fossil fuels in Iraq and elsewhere was both costly and put lives at risk—“one soldier was killed for every twenty-four convoys to resupply fuel or water” in Afghanistan. And costs were exorbitant. Getting fuel to remote locations in Iraq and Afghanistan for each gallon cost “a whopping $400 by the time the costs of transport and security were fully factored in.”

In the effort to shift away from fossil fuels, as with her other efforts, Goodman put a premium on data. One result: a study entitled “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden.”

Even with co-benefits, cost savings, and mission alignment, shifting an entire institutional culture is challenging. Though many military leaders began to embrace the linkages between the military mission, environmental stewardship, and climate action, embrace of this vision was neither immediate nor uniform.

During my eight years at the Department of the Interior, we sometimes struggled to come to agreement with DOD on “how clean is clean enough” in removing risks of unexploded ordinance on former military lands transferred to the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Land Management. I recall BLM’s challenges at the transferred Fort Ord lands, arguing that firefighting on these lands required more extensive cleanup that the military was reluctant to undertake.

We faced DOD sluggishness in efforts to clean up lead paint devastating to Laysan albatross on Midway Island. I met with some military commanders that continued to see protections of endangered species as a distracting nuisance; others, as Goodman recounts, enthusiastically embraced environmental protections and found ways to make such protections, as in the case of the woodpecker, part of their training.

With the surge of climate change effects and despite deep partisan divisions on the issue, the case has become even more compelling for the military to invest in environmental protection, climate mitigation, and climate adaptation. Goodman has played a fundamental role in this evolution: climate change is a “threat multiplier,” a term Goodman invented that has been embraced not only by the U.S. military but by other nations, as well.

Goodman had ample direct evidence to substantiate this perspective. Laying out the case she articulated to military leadership both during and after her time at DOD, she recounts the effects of climate change on military installations, on other nations and the safety and stability of their populations, on geopolitical dynamics, and much more. Many of these effects were not hypothetical or the result of predictive modeling. They unfolded real-time.

Several dramatic events underscore threats to the military from climate change. Hurricane Sandy devastated Coast Guard Station Sandy Hook, rendering it inoperable. Goodman reports Admiral Phillips of the Coast Guard lamenting that “we were not able to execute our duties.” Contemplating the effects, Admiral Phillips observed: “It’s a series of cascading casualties with increasing significance over time, and we are behind the rate of change.”

Similar risks were (and are) evident elsewhere. Norfolk, Virginia, home of a large Navy base, faces the highest rates of sea-level rise on the East Coast, imperiling operations. Hurricane Michael decimated Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida in 2018. The list goes on, prompting former defense secretary Leon Panetta to opine, as Goodman recounts, that rather than wishing for the past, we need to prepare for a “future climate Pearl Harbor.”

Goodman’s threat multiplier framework extends beyond climate impacts to military installations. It extends to the nature of national security challenges. Goodman points to the Arctic, where melting sea ice “is the proverbial ‘canary’ in the earth climate system,” with significant geopolitical implications. Rear Admiral David Titley told Goodman, “We are witnessing a failure of imagination” in contemplating how climate change affects military readiness. Goodman suggests that “climate change has produced a different ‘battlefield’ for just about every scenario a planner can now imagine…altering the geostrategic landscape.” Chinese vessels now ply the Arctic; Russia and others eye potential fuels and minerals extraction on the Arctic seabed—all these activities in close proximity to the United States.

Goodman also points to natural resource conditions across the globe—whether in the form of chronic drought, extreme wildland fires, flooding, and more—and what she calls a “direct correlation between stability and access to natural resources.” These conditions make climate change “inextricably linked” to national security, as they can bring civil unrest and heighten risks of conflict.

Despite the fits and starts and uneven embrace of investment in environmental protections and climate action across a sprawling national defense system, Goodman’s message is optimistic. She is optimistic because of the intrinsic linkage of climate and environmental investments and national security. She is optimistic because the military is a force of innovation, as in its pioneering of new liquid fuels for naval and aviation operations that reduce greenhouse gases. She is optimistic because so many allies are cooperating on climate action. She sees investments in innovation as “opportunity multipliers.”

But Goodman is also realistic. The event at which she spoke about the threat multiplier of climate change took place November 6, one day after the election. With a new administration for which climate action is viewed with skepticism or hostility, what, asked the audience, are the prospects for continued progress by the military in advancing clean energy, climate-resilient infrastructure, and more?

Her message is twofold. First, current actions to invest in climate resilience, greenhouse gas reductions, energy efficiency, and more are fundamentally imperatives for national security. The nation simply cannot have its military installations regularly flooding, its electric power going out for days on end, or troops at acute risk in transporting fossil fuels to battlefields. Business as usual is simply not sustainable, as one Navy vice admiral told Goodman. Second, sometimes labels matter. Some DOD activities come under labels of water security, or energy efficiency, or electric power reliability. All of these endeavors are part of a climate action portfolio, but they do not require that label for their justification. They will, Goodman argues, continue.

Threat Multiplier, packed full of facts about military operations, is also a story of political acuity in which the author understood how to emphasize “mission first,” multi-benefits, collaboration, and innovation to drive change. Looking at the results of her efforts, Goodman embraces Madeleine Albright’s quip: “I’m an optimist who worries a lot.”

Lynn Scarlett was deputy secretary of the interior in the Bush II administration.

Lynn Scarlett On Environment as a “Threat Multiplier” 

Earth’s Climate Sensitivity and Related Institutional Sensitivity
Author
Craig M. Pease - Former Law School Professor
Former Law School Professor
Current Issue
Issue
5
Craig M. Pease

Carbon dioxide is on track to double its pre-industrial level. It is now 420 parts per million, up from 280 ppm. How much will doubling carbon dioxide increase temperature? Though simple to pose, the question of climate sensitivity is devilishly complex to answer.

Earlier this year, in a cutting edge Science Advance paper, the paleoclimatologist Vincent Cooper and colleagues estimate climate sensitivity of 2.9°C. Their paper has data and computer models galore. Their statistics describe not just Earth’s current temperature and climate, but also temperature and ice sheets 21,000 years ago.

Those reconstructed temperatures, derived from marine microfossils, separately estimate past ocean temperatures in the west Pacific, east Pacific, and southern oceans near Antarctica. Their computer model of coupled atmosphere/ocean/ice climate dynamics is grounded in the chemistry, physics, and climatology of carbon dioxide, water, and other greenhouse gases, and contains a detailed description of continents, oceans, and ice fields.

A central difficulty faced by Cooper, and indeed by all scientific studies of climate sensitivity, is that the direct impact of carbon dioxide emissions get amplified. With no amplification pathways, doubling carbon dioxide would cause only about 1.1°C warming.

Yet actual climate sensitivity is at least double what carbon dioxide acting alone would cause. Water mediates many of those amplification pathways. Depending on whether it is liquid, vapor, ice, or clouds, water can either diminish or amplify the temperature increase from carbon dioxide alone. For example, ice reflects sunlight, but water vapor is itself a greenhouse gas.

Perhaps worse, those amplification pathways not only increase Earth’s temperature, but also increase error. Amplifying error is not good. In a study that extrapolates Earth’s climate out many decades, it is inevitable that small initial errors in temperature data or model specification will get amplified into big errors.

The Cooper paper is a tour de force. Yet, their estimate has wide error bounds, with a 95 percent chance that climate sensitivity is somewhere between 2.1°C and 4.1°C. I doubt future climate studies will materially reduce these error bounds.

What I found most striking about the Cooper paper is a pressing issue they do not mention at all—how will carbon dioxide alter human institutions? This might be dubbed institutional sensitivity. As an exemplar, consider the ecosystem of institutions that govern water in the western United States. These include many factors: prior appropriation water right law, irrigation districts, the California Water Project, the Clean Water Act and its rules and case law, the Army Corps of Engineers, federal, state, and private governance of dams, state governance of groundwater, economic markets, and so forth.

These institutions are being stressed. Under threat of immediate water curtailments on hundreds of thousands of acres of Idaho farmland, in June past senior and junior water rights holders agreed to a one-year mitigation plan that will allow the Idaho Department of Water Resources to lift its proposed curtailment orders.

To be clear, it is not at all obvious that the Idaho water shortages are related to climate change. Over millennia, even in the absence of anthropogenic carbon dioxide, the western United States has been subject to regular extreme droughts and floods. Moreover, climate models typically do not allow a specific drought or flood to be attributed to climate change.

Even so, while the direct impacts of carbon dioxide on temperature, rainfall, and overall climate are quite worrisome, I suspect our more immediate concern should be on how carbon dioxide impacts human institutions. Institutions, not temperature, will mediate most all climate impacts on humanity. Human institutional ecosystems now dominate natural ecosystems. They resolve conflicts and promote cooperative use and sharing of water and all other critical natural resources. Were they to fail under the pressure of climate change, there is an extreme downside.

Alas, we cannot quantify this downside risk. The Cooper paper is grounded on data going back tens of thousands of years. By contrast, essentially all western water institutions came into existence post-Civil War. And while the Cooper analysis of climate sensitivity is based on well verified scientific principles, such as quantum mechanics and black body radiation, no comparable general principles might guide an investigation of institutional sensitivity.

When change—-climate or otherwise—-carries a material risk of catastrophic failure, the only rational politics and policy is one of extreme conservatism—-conserving the existing climate, and thereby conserving existing natural ecosystems and existing human institutions.

Earth’s Climate Sensitivity and Related Institutional Sensitivity.

Was the Copenhagen summit a failure: What will the international climate change regime look like in the next three to five years?
Author
Kyle Danish - Van Ness Feldman
Bill Fang - Edison Electric Institute
Meghan McGuinness - National Commission on Energy Policy
William L. Thomas - Skadden
Jacob Werksman - World Resources Institute
Van Ness Feldman
Edison Electric Institute
National Commission on Energy Policy
Skadden
World Resources Institute
Current Issue
Issue
2
Resolved: Using Nuclear and Coal power in an Environmentally Friendly Manner Is the Path Forward in Controlling Climate Change
Author
Matthew Wald - New York Times
Garry Brown - New York State Public Sector Commission
Mike Morris - American Electric Power
Alex Flint - Union of Concerned Scientists
Jon Wellinghoff - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
New York Times
New York State Public Sector Commission
American Electric Power
Union of Concerned Scientists
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Current Issue
Issue
1
Planetary Crises: The End of “Our Fragile Moment” on Earth?
Author
Lisa Benjamin - Lewis & Clark Law School
Lewis & Clark Law School
Current Issue
Issue
2

With climate change and extreme weather events making daily headlines, Michael Mann’s new book Our Fragile Moment: How Lessons From Earth’s Past Can Help Us Survive the Climate Crisis provides an in-depth look at our planet’s critical events triggered by nature at work alone—illustrating what we can learn from them while battling our own, human-made, crisis.

Working in climate change, I often hear the claim that the Earth has been through, and survived, several crises in the past, and the climate crisis will be no different than these earlier events. While climate change is nonetheless painted in stark detail in this book, Mann provides a user-friendly guide to what kind of events have preceded this current crisis, and how various species did (or did not) survive these past junctures. Most importantly, he finds parallels (and also differences) between these past events from characteristics of the climate crisis. The outcome is both reassuring in some aspects, and frightening in others.

Mann is a renowned climate scientist, and director of the Center for Science, Sustainability & the Media at the University of Pennsylvania. One of his most famous works is the “hockey stick” graph (first published in 1990s), which became an icon of climate science. It indeed looks like a hockey stick lying on its side, blade tilted up. Global average temperature is on the Y-axis, time along the X-axis. The graph shows thousands of years of a relative stable climate flat as time progresses along the X-axis—but the blade sticks up at the far right when temperature increases rapidly due to human-induced changes to the climate since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.

As Mann himself describes the graph in his book, the sheer simplicity of the sharply angled line made it so popular: “You do not need to know about the complexities of climate science to understand the message of the graph: that we are perturbing our planet’s climate in a profound way.”

The graph also made Mann the target of significant attacks from climate deniers. As a result, Mann sued two climate deniers for defamation, and over a decade after initiating the litigation, in February he was awarded $1 million in damages by a jury. His work, and public persona defending climate science, has made him a profound and important thinker in the climate change arena. Most relevant for this piece, his new publication makes complex Earth history accessible to non-scientists.

Mann’s book is clearly written and easily accessible. It charts major events in Earth’s history, and connects each to the climate crisis. He also helpfully weaves in his own personal narrative and experiences with some of the effects of the climate crisis that we see today.

The result is some tamping down on climate doomism—while the climate crisis has some hallmarks of these other catastrophic events, it does not include all of them. As a result, he helpfully navigates the reader toward an understanding that the climate crisis is real, requires urgent attention, and may cost hundreds of millions of lives if more urgent political action is not taken. But he is also careful not to fall into the mire of the inevitable destruction of human civilization from climate change. Instead, he links what the climate crisis might look like with each degree or fraction of a degree of warming.

He is also very careful in this work to clarify the narrative around uncertainty. Many climate sceptics and climate deniers point to uncertainty in climate models to build a tale that we do not need to act urgently on climate change. Mann takes the opposite view. In many parts of the book he illustrates that uncertainty is not our friend. Some climate models are not able to, or not accurately able to, account for certain phenomena, and so may be overly conservative and thereby can underpredict key impacts.

An example he gives toward the end of the book is the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, which appears to be exceeding past model predictions. The additional water entering the oceans would not only raise sea levels, but may contribute to the collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation—and this could already be underway. These underpredicted events could interact with other climate-related events, and cause more cascading negative effects than currently anticipated. In this respect, Mann is clear that uncertainty is cause for more (not less) urgent action on reducing emissions of fossil fuels and other measures.

Mann begins his work by explaining how fragile the climate conditions are that allow humans to live on Earth. He explains that there is a relatively narrow envelope of climate variability within which human civilization remains viable. The concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere today is already well outside the range that existed when our civilization arose. This is our fragile moment. Despite this, there is also, within Earth’s history, lessons around climate resiliency (he explains this through the Gaia effect). As a result, while climate change is a crisis, it is, for now, a solvable crisis. While we have the advantage of anticipating the future through climate models, he cautions that we also have to respect planetary thresholds—exceeding those thresholds will exceed the adaptive capacity of human civilization, so past examples of societal collapse are important warnings for us to heed.

Mann walks us through the Permian-Triassic extinction (or the Great Dying) 250 million years ago. Ninety six percent of marine species died off, along with two thirds of amphibian and reptile species, and one third of insects. What caused this event? Spiking levels of carbon dioxide caused massive heat and drying, and dramatic falls in oxygen, leading to hypoxia, all probably caused by volcanic eruptions. These events were all concentrated on the one continent on the globe at the time, which geologists call Pangea.

Our input of carbon dioxide is actually more rapid than that which occurred during the Great Dying; indeed, it is almost a hundred times faster, which is not good news, particularly for our marine environments. Recent research demonstrates that the oceans are warming faster than models originally predicted. Again, as Mann reiterates throughout his work, uncertainty is not our friend.

While today we have similar effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide increases and ocean acidification going on, we do not seem to have other similar contributors to the Great Dying, such as atmospheric anoxia (lack of oxygen) or the global hydrogen sulfide “stink bomb” effect (think rotten eggs) so while there is cause for concern, we are not automatically doomed to replicate the Great Dying.

Mann also draws comparisons, and distinctions, with the K-Pg event—the asteroid collision in what is today Mexico’s Yucatan region which led to the extinction of the dinosaurs. This massive event created significant cooling, not heating. But it is the rapid scale of the change which should give us pause. Plants and animals cannot adapt to rapid changes, and the rate of change today of shifts in climate zones exceeds the ability of species to adapt and move to more favorable regions.

Similar lessons can be learned from the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (otherwise known as Hothouse Earth). This period of rapid warming occurred 55 million years ago. Rapid releases of carbon that accompanied this event are probably the closest analogy we have to the existing climate crisis. And tellingly, the elevated levels of warmth lasted for 200,000 years after the Hothouse Earth event was triggered.

While our rate of warming is faster, Hothouse Earth did not see a “methane bomb” such as the one that concerns us today with permafrost melting (although he caveats this, as our methane locations differ), and Hothouse Earth was characterized by greater climate sensitivity. This means there is good news and bad news. The good news is if we maintain the climate policies we have today, we are unlikely to experience the same Hothouse Earth dystopia. The bad news? If we do not ambitiously increase our climate action and instead reach the upper end of temperature predictions (7°F by the end of the century), Mann directly states that we and our progeny are in for a world of hurt.

Mann ends with a balanced call to action. Instead of submitting to doomsayers and the emotions of fear, anxiety, and depression, which can lead to passivity, he charts a call to action through the use of righteous anger. The failure of ambitious climate action is not a failure of technology, science, or even society. It is a failure of politics—funded and underpinned by climate deception tactics of the fossil fuel industry. The identification of these bad actors can motivate us to engage in political action to combat these forces.

He ends with a measured and sober picture of the future. Even in a business-as-usual scenario, where we do not exceed 3°C by the end of this century, there will be no methane bombs, no runaway warming, and no Hothouse Earth. But there will be a tremendous amount of human suffering, species extinction, loss of life, chaos, conflict, and destabilization of social structures.

This would be the end of our fragile moment—and is not a world any of us should want to live in. According to Mann, if we seize this brittle juncture to rapidly phase out fossil fuels and take other urgent and ambitious action on climate change, we should not have to live in such a world.

Lisa Benjamin is an associate professor at Lewis & Clark Law School.

On Michael Mann's Our Fragile Moment.

Nuclear Power Is Not Clean and Not Safe Enough
Author
Edwin Lyman - Union of Concerned Scientists
Union of Concerned Scientists
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article
Edwin Lyman

People who argue nuclear power is essential to combat climate change stress that wind and solar power are variable resources, dismissing the potential for energy storage, transmission, and grid management improvements that could bridge gaps between renewable energy supply and demand. Yet they are bullish on nuclear energy’s ability to quickly overcome the problems that caused it to lose support and stagnate in recent decades, including high cost, construction delays, inflexibility, safety risks, nuclear weapons proliferation, and the never-ending waste-disposal stalemate. This way of thinking is rooted more in technological bias than in logical analysis.

Our low-carbon energy future is not set in stone (or uranium). But the nuclear industry hopes to make itself look indispensable while struggling to stay relevant in the face of rapidly increasing deployment of renewable energy—as costs plummet (by about 70 and 80 percent for land-based wind and utility-scale solar power since 2010, respectively). In contrast, recent nuclear projects are losing against renewables because they have not realized the dramatic cost and schedule reductions promoters promised. The $35 billion twin-unit AP1000 plant at Plant Vogtle in Georgia has famously ended up costing more than twice as much and taking about twice as long to build as initially projected.

Westinghouse’s main rationale for the AP1000, an evolutionary variant of previous light-water reactors, was to slash capital cost by significantly reducing materials, components, and the volume of buildings that must meet the highest safety and seismic standards. It didn’t work. Vogtle’s cost per megawatt dwarfs that of another budget-busting nuclear project, the Olkiluoto EPR in Finland, even though the EPR’s design offers enhanced safety over cutting cost.

Undaunted, nuclear boosters brush off the Vogtle fiasco, claiming the future lies in cheaper “small modular reactors” or even tinier “micro-reactors” that can be deployed in locations not feasible for large plants. But a lower price tag doesn’t guarantee small reactors will be more economical: Diseconomies of scale dictate they will generate more expensive electricity unless capital and operating expenses can be slashed well below any reductions obtained by simply scaling down.

And while reactor design standardization may reduce cost and speed up deployment, the Department of Energy is pursuing the opposite approach, spreading development dollars among a vast menagerie of exotic reactor concepts. Many would use specialized fuels, materials, and components that need unique supply chains and manufacturing facilities. While no one wants the government to be in the business of picking winners and losers, this scattershot policy risks adding up to a whole lot of nothing.

To cut costs and speed up deployment of these first-of-a-kind reactors, developers are irresponsibly seeking many exemptions from fundamental safety requirements, such as robust, leak-tight containments; materials and construction of the highest quality; and full complements of trained operators and security personnel. And to facilitate reactor siting near densely populated areas or hazardous industrial facilities, the industry wants to forego the emergency planning critical to protect communities from a major accident or terrorist attack. Even so, after cutting numerous safety corners, NuScale, the most mature U.S. small modular reactor project, experienced a 50 percent increase in its projected power cost and was dumped by its only viable customer in November 2023.

Developers justify their push for weakened regulations by claiming their reactors are safer than current-generation plants. But a 2021 Union of Concerned Scientists review found these experimental reactors pose novel and poorly understood risks—which will be aggravated if there is a rush to license technically immature designs under less stringent rules that do not require the same safety margins and redundant layers of protection as operating reactors have.

Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is significantly easing its licensing rules, pro-nuclear organizations unfairly scapegoat it for the largely self-inflicted problems that are causing nuclear to lose the race with renewables, urging the agency to even more drastically gut the regulations that have helped U.S. reactors remain meltdown-free since the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. These groups claim nuclear power is “clean” and that its safety risks have been exaggerated, downplaying the disasters that the world witnessed with horror at Chernobyl and Fukushima. While they say they act in the public interest, their anti-regulatory stance and denial of the dangers of ionizing radiation are totally in synch with the nuclear industry’s bottom line. Rigorous studies show that low exposures to radioactive materials can cause cancer and even cardiovascular disease. It is simply false advertising to label as “clean” a power source that generates copious quantities of long-lived poisons with the potential to severely damage the environment.

Nuclear safety should not be traded away to give the industry a leg up in its competition with rapidly advancing renewables. Nuclear power will succeed only if it can achieve a safety level high enough to effectively preclude another Fukushima-scale accident—or worse—that could send public support of the technology to the basement for another generation.

Edwin Lyman is the director of nuclear power safety at the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Creating a New Pathway for Nuclear Energy
Author
Jon-Michael Murray - Clean Air Task Force
Clean Air Task Force
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article
Jon-Michael Murray

The recent commitment at COP28 by nearly two dozen countries—including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, and France—to triple their nuclear energy capacity by 2050 underscores a simple truth: expanding nuclear energy is essential for meeting decarbonization targets amidst growing global energy demand. Overreliance on a single set of technologies is not the best recipe for success. Instead, a robust portfolio of solutions is needed to meet the size and complexity of the challenge. But at the same time, cost matters. Capital must be allocated wisely in a world of scarce resources. In that light, costs must be reduced and delivery times accelerated if nuclear energy is to play a significant role in the energy transition.

Global decarbonization scenarios predict a substantial increase in electric power output by mid-century, a doubling or even tripling of current capacity. This surge will be driven by electrification of various sectors and heightened demand, particularly in developing regions. While renewables such as wind and solar will serve as cornerstones of a decarbonized electricity grid, studies consistently highlight the need for substantial amounts of non-weather-dependent, always-available zero-carbon power to maintain reliability and contain costs.

Nuclear energy is already the world’s largest source of this kind of “clean firm” power available today. And it can address several critical aspects of the energy transition. It can reduce the need to build excess wind and solar capacity many times over peak demand, as well as expensive, rarely-called-upon energy storage. Due to its energy density and siting flexibility, it can reduce critical minerals and materials requirements and ease land-use and grid infrastructure barriers. It can also reduce exposure to climate-related risks, while lessening widespread curtailments of energy demand. Finally, by avoiding the challenges of siting excessive solar and wind projects, it can accelerate the energy transition.

Despite these apparent advantages, nuclear energy development has stagnated globally. While determined minority public opposition continues to be a challenge for nuclear expansion in some locales, and for individual projects, increasingly, concerns around cost and competitiveness weigh more heavily. These concerns are not unfounded. Recent large light-water reactor projects such as Olkiluoto in Finland and Vogtle in the U.S. state of Georgia, both of which were completed nearly a decade or more late and at least two times over budget, have understandably led critics to question whether the technology has a future. Indeed, the poor cost performance and high project delivery risk is one of the reasons current nuclear investment globally is so low compared to other low-carbon energy sources. And it is obvious that current global investment in new nuclear capacity is far lower than will be required to support a global rate of scale-up sufficient to meet future clean energy demands, let alone a tripling of capacity by 2050.

Flaws in the current delivery, business, and regulatory models for nuclear energy technology bear much of the blame. Remedying these flaws becomes urgent in the context of climate and economic development goals that demand rapid, simultaneous expansion of all low-carbon energy options, including nuclear, across multiple regions of the world. This seems like a daunting task, but it has been done before. From 1980 to 2000, global nuclear generating capacity—nearly all in the form of large conventional light-water reactors—grew rapidly, with as much as 30 gigawatts being added each year in the early 1980s, a rate of growth similar in magnitude to what might be needed today. However, recognizing that the nuclear industry of today, with its high cost and slow delivery time, is not sufficient to meet modern challenges, CATF has proposed six mutually reinforcing solutions to the current nuclear industry dysfunction.

The first is productization, a shift from slow, expensive mega-projects to standardized, manufactured products to achieve economies of scale and reduce costs. Second is prioritization of large order-books, aggregating demand for repeat builds of the same design to consolidate project risk and maximize learning-by-doing. Third is plant delivery integration. Independent Nuclear Development Organizations should be formed to streamline project development and deployment. Fourth is harmonized global licensing, which involves the creation of a Global Licensing Authority to provide globally accepted Design Acceptance Certificates. Fifth is technical support for new nuclear nations, requiring the creation of an International Technical Support Organization to assist first-time nuclear countries in overcoming licensing barriers. Finally, sixth is broader access to financing, achieved by establishing an International Bank for Nuclear Infrastructure to provide financing and support for nuclear programs.

These proposed solutions represent a new pathway for nuclear energy to meet the climate and human development challenges of the coming decades. Implementing them will significantly disrupt existing industry practices, amounting to a fundamental reset in how nuclear energy is licensed and delivered, but the effort will be worthwhile if nuclear can live up to its full potential as a clean firm power source. If that is the case, then the energy transition will be much faster and far less costly.

Jon-Michael Murray is CATF’s nuclear policy manager and is responsible for developing and advocating for policies that promote the development and deployment of advanced nuclear energy technologies in the United States and globally.

The Climate Needs Nuclear Energy
Author
Jackie Toth - Good Energy Collective
Good Energy Collective
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article
Jackie Toth

The world faces disaster from climate change, but building out our nuclear power capacity will help temper the the challenge. We will need more nuclear because new renewable generation alone is unlikely to supplant fossil fuels, and nascent carbon capture technologies may not mitigate environmental impacts from oil, gas, and coal.

According to the International Energy Agency, 87 percent of the total global energy supply in 1973 came from fossil fuels. In 2019, it was still 81 percent. The IEA projects that total energy demand could start declining through 2030 if all countries were to meet their climate targets on time or reach net-zero emissions by 2050. But look no further than COP28 to observe how off track the world is from these achievements.

In this landscape, nuclear alongside renewables offers key benefits. Reactors reliably produce about 10 percent of global electricity today. They release no operating emissions, and their median lifecycle emissions are on par with offshore wind.

Policymakers, including Democrats and progressives, recognize these assets and the ongoing improvements to the safety and efficiency of new nuclear designs. In a 2010 speech, President Obama acknowledged nuclear’s controversial stature while urging a fresh look at its role in meeting new energy demand and fighting climate change. President Biden is similarly supportive. When I was reporting on energy in 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) told me the Green New Deal resolution she sponsored “leaves the door open on nuclear.” She supported the closure of the Indian Point nuclear plant north of New York City, but added that “one plant built decades ago is not emblematic of the technology that we have today.”

It’s true that renewables are less expensive to build than reactors. But the Department of Energy estimates in a recent “liftoff” report that advanced nuclear with tax credits will be cost-competitive with renewables plus long-duration storage, or with natural gas plus carbon capture, which would each provide similar low-carbon or reliability benefits.

Likewise, the least-cost transition to cleaner grids will not always maximize value for surrounding communities and workforces. Much of nuclear’s expense represents investments in local economies and labor. Today’s nuclear plants support 500-800 permanent workers across many professions and create thousands of jobs during construction. The plants also support communities with state and municipal tax payments and emergency preparedness funds. Job quality also matters: At 19 percent, nuclear’s workforce is the most unionized in the electric power generation sector, compared with 17 percent for coal, 12 percent for wind, and 11 percent for solar, according to the most recent U.S. Energy and Employment Report.

While nuclear energy has helped avoid 70 gigatonnes of global carbon emissions to date, nations like the United States still have important work to do to improve nuclear’s viability as a social and environmental tool. In some countries and communities, its wartime origins and three high-profile accidents contribute toward a prevailing sense of dread of nuclear energy. Past uranium extraction scarred landscapes. In the 20th century, U.S. officials knowingly failed to protect the indigenous Diné, who mined uranium for the government, from contamination and has yet to redress that harm. It is incumbent on both governments and developers to address public concerns about nuclear, involve potential host communities in new projects, and prioritize ethicality in sourcing nuclear fuels and materials.

And people rightly ask: What about nuclear waste? By the time of Obama’s 2010 remarks, he had directed DOE to convene experts who could recommend a comprehensive approach to managing domestic spent nuclear fuel. This was important. Although the United States has never experienced a release of nuclear waste from commercial plants, the 70-plus communities that host nuclear waste in over 30 states never agreed to hold it long-term. The experts’ first recommendation was for Congress to direct a process to site waste storage facilities based on local consent. Congress obliged. My organization, with our project partners at the University of Notre Dame, are among DOE’s awardees to propose a community-involved approach to storing nuclear waste.

One thing that new advanced reactors may not be able to do is meaningfully reduce global emissions by 2030. But the climate will not stop heating after that date. New nuclear could make a critical dent in emissions by mid-century. According to the IEA, 35 percent of the emissions reductions the world would need to achieve to reach carbon neutrality in 2050 will come from technologies like small modular reactors that aren’t yet on the market.

Pollsters at Gallup and Pew Research Center have charted recent increases in U.S. adults’ favorability toward nuclear. Hopefully for the planet, those results reflect a durable recognition that, if approached ethically, nuclear can address climate change while providing local value.

Jackie Toth is deputy director of Good Energy Collective. She is a former energy and environment policy journalist.